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Abstract
We compare the welfare effects in equilibrium of two environmental regulations
that aim at increasing the new cars fleet’s average fuel efficiency: the fuel economy
standards and the feebate policies. Maintaining the same environmental benefit and
tax revenue, we simulate the implementation of each policy in France and the United
States. Standard-type policies have larger negative welfare effects, up to 1.7 times
those from the feebate. Effects on manufacturers are heterogeneous: some are better
off under the standard regulation. The addition of a market to trade levels of fuel
efficiency dominates the simple standard regulation and the feebate. We also consider
the attribute-based standard, technological improvements, and the equivalence with
fuel taxes as extensions.
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1 Introduction
Environmental regulations have been introduced in most developed countries in the past ten
years to reduce carbon dioxide emissions related to new cars. There are two major types of
environmental policies that target the market for new vehicles: the fuel efficiency standards
that constrain manufacturers, and consumer taxes or subsidies. In the United States, the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards have been in place since 1978 and have
been strengthened twice during the past 39 years. They impose a minimum threshold of fuel
efficiency for manufacturers to be met with their sales-weighted average of fuel efficiency. A
fine is paid if there is no compliance.
More recently, a CO2 emissions standard regulation has been introduced in Europe. The
mandatory emissions target reductions regulation became fully binding for the first time
in 2015 after an experimental stage that started in 2012. However, fuel efficiency or CO2
emissions-based purchasing taxes have been common in European countries such as Germany
and the United Kingdom since before. Other countries have introduced subsidies for fuel
efficient and alternative fuel or hybrid vehicles. This is the case of Sweden with its “Green
Car Rebates program” and of the “Running on Green Power” rebate program for electric
vehicles in Canada. The combination of fees and rebates schemes, or feebates, has been in
place in large jurisdictions, such as California in the U.S. and Wallonia in Belgium, and in
entire countries, such as in France through the “bonus/malus” policy since 2008.
This paper analyses and compares the fuel efficiency standard and feebate instruments.
Both regulations share the same objective −to improve the fuel efficiency of new vehicles−
but differ in their implementation. We quantitatively investigate their effects using product-
level data from the U.S. and the French automobile markets together with a structural model
of market equilibrium to determine whether one policy dominates the other for different levels
of the regulation stringency. The question of policy efficiency is non-trivial as it crucially
depends on the weight allocated to the policy outcome relative to the welfare effects. Instead,
we develop a framework that allows us to carry a fair comparison by simulating the effects
of the two policies when they are equivalent in terms of (i) the fleet-wide fuel efficiency
outcome and (ii) the total amount of tax revenue raised. We compare welfare effects of the
two policies both at the aggregate level and across manufacturers. Since these two countries
differ in several dimensions, comparing the same policies in each of them allows us to draw
conclusions that extend beyond the characteristics of one particular market.
We focus on the short-term incentives induced by the regulations, i.e. the manufacturers’
reactions through the modifications of the prices, and we rule out the possibility to design
new models or improve the fuel efficiency of the existing car models. Both policies give the
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same long-term incentives: a manufacturer will improve the fuel efficiency of its vehicles to
avoid the constraint under the fuel efficiency standard, or to take advantage of subsidies given
to consumers when there are feebates.
Under the CAFE standard, manufacturers have an incentive to lower the price of cars with
high fuel efficiency and to increase the price of those with low fuel efficiency in order to comply
with the regulation or reduce the penalties. Since there are strategic interactions between
manufacturers, the changes in prices for a given manufacturer depend on how affected its
competitors are. Feebate-type policies modify the final prices faced by the consumers. The
manufacturers, anticipating the amount of rebates or taxes paid by consumers in addition
to the posted prices, have incentives to decrease the posted prices of fuel inefficient vehicles
and increase the prices of fuel efficient vehicles.
Gasoline taxes would provide a first best solution to this externality problem, but given the
political aspects associated with them, we abstract from their discussion for the main results
and focus solely on those two other policies that are a second best solution notwithstanding.
In the extensions to the model we compare the two policies to an equivalent fuel tax increase.
There have been a number of previous studies on the short-term effects of increasing the
U.S. CAFE standards (Goldberg [1998], West [2004], Kleit [2004], Austin and Dinan [2005],
Gramlich [2009], and Jacobsen [2013]) and on the European feebate programs (Adamou
et al. [2014], D’Haultfœuille et al. [2014], Huse and Lucinda [2014], and D’Haultfœuille et al.
[2016]) but very few on the empirical cross-policy comparison. One of the closest studies
to ours is Gillingham [2013] who uses the National Energy Modelling System (NEMS) to
simulate CAFE policies and contrast them with a feebate policy. We find similar results
in the ranking of the two policies. Another study due to Roth [2015], who analyses the
two policies and their complementarity with R&D incentives and vehicle tax credits using
a general equilibrium approach. Our method differs from those studies in that they neglect
strategic interactions between manufacturers.
The attribute-based version of the CAFE standards has sprung a novel strand of the litera-
ture, as in the work by Ito and Sallee [2015] who analyse the theoretical aspects of the incen-
tives to modify products’ characteristics and find evidence of such changes in the Japanese
car market. Another example is Reynaert [2015] who investigates manufacturers’ reactions
to the European attribute-based standard, taking into account trends of past technological
adoption. Whitefoot et al. [2015] and Huse and Lucinda [2015] endogenise technological de-
cisions coupled with pricing strategies. The first make use of engineering design functions to
predict car characteristics whereas the second uses estimates based on observable attributes.
In either case, their problem is equivalent to finding equilibrium solutions over two or more
vectors where one of them corresponds to the equilibrium prices. We also consider scenarios
3
with technological improvements on the fuel efficiency. Unlike the two aforementioned stud-
ies, we circumvent the potential problems of multiplicity of equilibria by exogenously allowing
the imports of existing car models in Europe into the American market and by introducing
hybrid versions of existing car models.
We start with a series of theoretical results that compare the two policies under simple
market structures. We show that the policies are welfare equivalent under symmetry of
manufacturers and full compliance. When we depart from the symmetry assumption, we are
only able to compare the magnitude of price distortions. We also assess the changes caused
by the attribute-based standards and a trading system for fuel efficiency similar to those in
the 2011 CAFE regulations in the U.S. and the 2015 European standard.
We use data that consist of all sales of new cars in France and the U.S. by car model
and their main characteristics. We are able, using a nested logit demand system, to recover
parameters of preferences such as price sensitivities and valuations of car attributes. Using
a structural model of supply, and assuming that market outcomes correspond to those of a
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, we recover estimates of marginal costs for all the products in
the market. Then we simulate the introduction of the two regulations for different levels of
stringency and compare the effects on policy outcomes −consumer surplus, distribution of
profits, and welfare.
Our results show that CAFE standard policies are consistently dominated by feebate poli-
cies. As we increase the stringency of the policies, welfare losses monotonically increase in
both the U.S. and France. However, we find important differences between the two countries.
Welfare losses from a standard-type policy in the U.S. are about 1.1 times those of an equiv-
alent feebate-type policy that achieves the same improvement in fleet-wide fuel efficiency
and the same amount of tax revenue. In France, this difference is larger: up to 1.7 times
depending on policy parameters. We decompose these welfare losses at the individual manu-
facturer level and find large amounts of heterogeneity in the effects on profits, indicating that
for some firms the standard regulation would be preferred over the feebate. Including the
welfare gains from the reduction in CO2 emissions leads to similar conclusions since welfare
levels change by amounts less than 1%.
We also study the effects of the new formats of CAFE standards. In the case of trading of
credits on top of the regular standard, welfare is larger than in the traditional standard and
feebate regulations for both countries. Attribute-based standards relax the constraint with
respect to the traditional CAFE standard policy for the U.S. but not in France.
As extensions of the model we consider two forms of technological improvements. First,
we allow for imports of French car models into the U.S. that would contribute towards
compliance. This reduces the losses in welfare relative to our benchmark scenario. Second,
4
we allow for the introduction of hybrid versions of existing car models and we find that feebate
policies become welfare-improving in both markets while the standard is welfare improving
in the U.S. only when including benefits from the reduction in CO2 emissions. As a final
extension, we compute the equivalent fuel tax in each market that would yield the same fuel
efficiency as in our benchmark case. We obtain an equivalent fuel tax of 32% for the U.S.
and 15% for France. These numbers put in perspective our welfare results and indicate a
non-negligible effect on taxes if this was the preferred policy to be used.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe the two environmen-
tal policies. In Section 3 we introduce the model for each policy and some theoretical insights
into the comparison of the policies. Section 4 describes the data and estimation results. The
simulation outcomes and policy comparisons are presented in Section 5. We conclude with
Section 6.
2 Environmental Policies
The CAFE standard regulations implemented in the U.S. and Canada consist of, in their
most general form, a threshold of fuel economy that each manufacturer’s fleet average must
meet. This regulation has a long history, starting as a response to the Arab oil embargo
in 1973-1974. A manufacturer’s CAFE is the weighted harmonic mean of miles per gallon
of all the cars in a manufacturer’s fleet for a given year. The weights are derived from the
number of vehicles sold during that year. Compliance occurs when the manufacturer’s CAFE
is above the standard for that year. When a manufacturer’s CAFE is below the standard, it
incurs a penalty of $55 per mile per gallon under the target value times the total volume of
vehicles sold in a given year.
Since 1983, manufacturers have paid more than $500 million in penalties. The CAFE
standard is a policy that primarily affects the supply side of the automobile market. It is
not clear how much of the constraint imposed by the regulation is passed-through to the
prices paid by consumers. Moreover, this policy only affects the extensive margin since, once
the vehicle has been purchased, the policy has no direct effect on the intensive margin, as
opposed to a gasoline tax which has a direct effect on the intensive margin of both old and
new vehicles.
Starting with car models 2012, the U.S. changed the way CAFE standards are implemented.
They are now a function of the car’s footprint size –the area obtained by multiplying the
length of the wheelbase and the car’s width– establishing stricter thresholds for smaller cars.
Since these modifications depend on a physical characteristic of the vehicle and not just the
car’s maker, this version of the CAFE is referred to as “attribute-based”. These changes also
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include rulemakings to trade levels of fuel efficiency among manufacturers.1
In Europe, a standard-type policy has been implemented in recent years but it defines the
threshold in terms of CO2 emissions instead of fuel efficiency. This emissions reduction target
program was first implemented in a non-binding form in 2012. For 2015, the law requires that
the new cars have less than 130 grams of CO2 emissions per kilometer. The corresponding
target for 2020 is 95 (European Commission [2015]).
In France, the “bonus/malus” policy was introduced in 2008 and attempts to improve fuel
efficiency by targeting consumers directly. It is a scheme of fees and rebates (feebate) based
on CO2 emissions of new cars. Initially, this system was designed to be revenue-neutral:
taxes were meant to exactly offset the total amount of rebates. Its purpose was to lower
the average emissions produced by cars to reach 130 grams of CO2 per kilometer by 2020.
Similarly, California proposed a feebate program in 2008 which eventually was merged into
the new structure of the CAFE standards that went into effect at the federal level in 2011.2
The 2008 French policy consisted of a financial rebate, from 200 to 1,000 euros, given
to consumers purchasing low CO2 emissions level vehicles (less than 130g/km). Consumers
buying polluting cars (more than 160g/km) were taxed, from 200 to 2,600 euros. The exact
amount of the rebate or the fee depended on the class of emissions of the vehicle. This
feebate was received or paid once, at the time of the sale of the vehicle. It applied to all new
cars, including those purchased abroad or manufactured abroad. Thus, unlike the standard
regulation, the feebate primarily affects the demand side. However, its effects on the intensive
and the extensive margins are similar to those of the CAFE standard policy.
3 The Model
To analyse the effects of these environmental policies, we first estimate the primitives of
the U.S. and the French car markets separately. We rely on a structural model of demand
and supply for new cars. For the demand system we use a nested logit specification. The
demand parameters for new cars are identified from the observed market shares and car
characteristics. The supply parameters are recovered assuming manufacturers compete in
prices, each selling a set of differentiated products.
1NHTSA [2014].
2The California’s Clean Car Discount program was proposed to go into effect on car models 2011 based
on a simple tax and rebate rule.
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3.1 Demand Model
Each consumer chooses either to purchase one of J products or not to buy any, which is the
outside option denoted by 0. The set of products is segmented in G + 1 groups. First, a
consumer chooses a group g, and then the consumer chooses a specific car model within this
group. Consumers do not have preferences for car models themselves but for the character-
istics of the cars, such as horsepower, size, fuel efficiency, or engine type. Those preferences
are represented by a linear function of characteristics of car model j following the nested
logit model of Berry [1994]:
Uij = δj + ζig + (1− σ)ij
δj = Xjβ − αpj + ξj
where Xj corresponds to observed characteristics of products, pj is the price, and ξj repre-
sents the valuation of unobserved characteristics. The term ζig + (1 − σ)ij represents the
idiosyncratic preference shock where ij is extreme-value distributed, and ζig is the group
specific random shock that allows for correlation of preferences over cars within the groups.
By construction 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. If σ is close to 1, all the car models within each group share the
same idiosyncratic term and the choice of a product within the segment is deterministic. If σ
is close to 0, the segmentation is irrelevant. Berry [1994] discusses how ζig + (1−σ)ij is also
extreme-value distributed. Because of this distributional assumption and since consumers
maximize their utility, the log of market share of good j is:
log sj = δj/(1− σ)− σ logDg + log s0
with Dg =
∑
j∈Jg exp(δj/(1− σ)) where Jg is the set of car models in group g and s0 is the
share of the outside good. Normalising the mean utility of the outside good to δ0 = 0 and
D0 = 1, we obtain
log sj − log s0 = δj + σ log sj|g,
where sj|g is the within-segment market share. This is the equation we take to the data.
We use an instrumental variable approach to address the endogeneity of prices and the
intra-group market share. Following the literature (e.g. Berry et al. [1995]), we construct
instruments which are functions of exogenous characteristics of other products.3 We make the
standard assumption that characteristics of cars are fixed while the prices can be adjusted.
These instruments are valid since they are correlated to the price through competition. If a
product has several close substitutes the manufacturer has less ability to set a high markup.
3These instruments are the sums of exogenous characteristics of: (1) other brands, (2) other brands
within the segment, and (3) other products of the same brand within the segment.
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3.2 Supply Model
We consider an oligopolistic market with a finite number of firms selling differentiated prod-
ucts. These firms are multi-product and set prices based on the demand levels. Profits of
firm m = 1, . . . ,M producing the set of goods Jm are:
Πm =
∑
j∈Jm
N (pj − cj) sj(p).
N is the number of potential buyers, sj(p) is the market share of product j that depends,
among other factors, on the vector of prices p of all the products in the market, and cj is the
marginal cost. Then the optimal price vector satisfies
p∗k = ck − [Ω−1(p∗)S(p∗)]k, (1)
where Ω(p) is the matrix of derivatives of market shares with respect to prices and
− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k represents the kth element of the vector of margins defined by− [Ω−1(p)S(p)].4
3.3 Introducing Environmental Policies
Fuel Economy Standard
The first policy considered is the introduction of a standard on fuel efficiency levels. We
follow the specifics in the implementation in the U.S. A manufacturer’s CAFE is defined
by the weighted harmonic mean of its cars’ fuel efficiency. The rationale behind the use
of the harmonic mean is to compute the average fuel efficiency associated with a constant
distance traveled by every car. Equivalently, we can define a manufacturer’s CAFE using the
arithmetic mean of fuel consumption −the inverse of the fuel efficiency− measured in gallons
per 100 miles. In this analysis, we use fuel consumption, the practice adopted elsewhere in the
literature to simplify the equations (see for example Goldberg [1998] and Roth [2015]). Thus
the CAFE standard regulation is defined by a maximum on the average fuel consumption of
a manufacturer’ fleet,
em(p) =
∑
j∈Jm sj(p)ej∑
j∈Jm sj(p)
.
To comply, manufacturers can only modify the prices, as we assume other characteristics,
fuel consumption in particular, to be exogenous and thus fixed. The constraint induced by
the standard may lead to large decreases in manufacturers’ profits up to the point where it
is preferable to pay the penalty and leave em above the standard. This payment is always
4The matrix Ω(p) is constructed as Ωkj(p) =
∂sj(p)
∂pk
if j, k ∈ Jm, and Ωkj(p) = 0 if products j and k
are not produced by the same firm.
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incurred when the manufacturer has no car model with fuel consumption below the standard.
Let e¯ be the fuel consumption standard imposed by the regulation, the cost of not complying
is set to be
Fm(p) = Nφ
∑
j∈Jm
sj(p)(em(p)− e¯) if em(p) > e¯
where φ is the unit penalty, and em is the manufacturer’s fuel consumption average as defined
above. The manufacturer has to pay the penalty for every car sold and for each unit of fuel
consumption above the standard.
The program of a manufacturer under the standard is:
maxpj,j∈Jm Πm(p)− Fm(p)
with Fm(p) = 0 if em(p) ≤ e¯,
Fm(p) = Nφ
∑
j∈Jm sj(p)(em(p)− e¯) if em(p) > e¯.
(2)
We can distinguish three statuses for manufacturers, and for each one we can express
the optimal prices after the introduction of a fuel consumption standard: (i) the ones that
change prices in order to comply and do not pay the penalty (the compliers), (ii) the ones
that prefer to pay the penalty and remain above the standard (the payers), and (iii) the ones
whose fleet average is already below the standard (the non-constrained), these are affected
by the regulation only through the strategic interactions with other manufacturers. For each
status of manufacturers, we solve the profit maximization problem to obtain the expression
for optimal car prices.
(i) The complier case.
The problem of a manufacturer m selling the set of cars Jm is
maxpj,j∈Jm Πm(p)
s.t. em(p) ≤ e¯,
(3)
where em is the manufacturer’s average fuel consumption and p is the vector of all the
prices. The complier has no incentive to achieve a fuel consumption level below the stan-
dard, therefore the constraint is binding. We consider the following Lagrangian to represent
manufacturer’s m problem:
L({pj,j∈Jm}, λm) =
∑
j∈Jm
(pj − cj)sj(p)− λm (em(p)− e¯) .
This Lagrangian takes into account the shadow costs of the policy through the last term of
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the expression above. The optimality conditions are
∑
j∈Jm
(
pj − cj − λm∑
h∈Jm sh(p)
(ej − e¯)
)
∂sj
∂pk
(p) + sk(p) = 0∑
j∈Jm sj(p)ej∑
j∈Jm sj(p)
− e¯ = 0
λm > 0.
Optimal price of car k ∈ Jm with the fuel economy standard regulation satisfies
p∗k =
(
ck + λ˜m(ek − e¯)
)
− [Ω−1(p∗)S(p∗)]
k
where λ˜m ≡ λm∑
h∈Jm sh(p)
. Imposing a fuel economy standard has an effect that can be com-
pared to a change in the marginal costs. If the car model has a higher (lower) fuel consumption
than the standard, then the standard has the same effect as an increase (decrease) on the
marginal cost of production of this car. The regulation can also be interpreted as an implicit
tax (subsidy) on the cars that are above (below) the standard. As a consequence, prices of
cars with fuel consumption below the standard decrease, and prices of cars above the stan-
dard increase. The magnitude of this effect depends on λ˜m which reflects how constrained
the manufacturer is by the regulation. λ˜m can be interpreted as an implicit or shadow cost
(per unit of fuel consumption) of the regulation; it is manufacturer specific and varies with
the policy level of stringency.
The CAFE standard has another effect on prices through the term [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k that is
modified by the regulation. However, it is not possible to predict the sign and the magnitude
of this indirect effect, which depends on substitution patterns across products and market
power of manufacturers. In perfect competition, the term [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k is equal to 0 and
the effect of the standard regulation is entirely passed-through to consumers’ prices.
(ii) The payer case.
The problem of a manufacturer m that does not comply with the regulation is
max
pj,j∈Jm
Πm(p)− Fm(p).
Solving this program leads to the following first order condition:∑
j∈Jm
(pj − cj − φ(ej − e¯)) ∂sj(p)
∂pk
+ sk(p) = 0.
Optimal price of car k under the CAFE standard regulation for a payer satisfies
p∗k = (ck + φ(ek − e¯))−
[
Ω−1(p∗)S(p∗)
]
k
.
The penalty has the same effect of an increase (decrease) in marginal cost for the cars that
have fuel consumption above (below) the standard.
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(iii) The non-constrained case.
The program of a non-constrained manufacturer is identical to (3), except that there is no
constraint on its CAFE. The expressions for the first order conditions are those shown in
equation (1): the manufacturer’s problem remains unchanged by the introduction of the
standard. However, because of strategic interactions, optimal prices are different after the
introduction of the standard since the term [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k is modified. A non-constrained
manufacturer increases its prices if the manufacturers that produce close substitutes are
constrained by the standard regulation.
The vector of equilibrium prices and λ˜ms after the regulation must satisfy simultaneously
the first order conditions of all manufacturers. We provide details on how to solve, in practice,
this system of equations in Appendix A.
Feebate
The second environmental regulation instrument studied here is the introduction of a pur-
chase tax and subsidy. Specifically, we consider a feebate scheme that introduces a tax for all
the vehicles with fuel consumption above a certain threshold called pivot point and a subsidy
for the car models with fuel consumption below the threshold. This policy is parameterised
by the pivot point e˜ and the feebate rate τ > 0 of taxation (subsidy) per unit of fuel con-
sumption above (below) the pivot point. We consider a simple feebate scheme that is linear
in fuel consumption. In practice, feebates can be non-linear and include discontinuities (as
seen in France and California) but we restrict our analysis to a feebate with two parameters
as we have only two targets: fuel efficiency outcome and tax revenue. The final price faced
by consumers is given by
pfj = pj + τ(ej − e˜).
Higher values of τ and e˜ make the policy more stringent, as they increase the marginal tax
rate and the set of cars taxed, respectively. The manufacturers’ objective is modified because
all the final prices faced by consumers are different except for those of the vehicles with fuel
consumption exactly equal to the pivot point. The profits under the feebate regulation are
Πm =
∑
j∈Jm
(pj − cj)sj(pf ),
where pf is the vector of all the final prices. It is useful to rewrite the manufacturer’s problem
in terms of final prices as
max
pfj,j∈Jm
∑
j
(
pfj − (cj + τ(ej − e˜)
)
sj(p
f ).
11
Therefore pf∗k = ck + τ(ek − e˜)−
[
Ω−1((pf∗)S(pf∗)
]
k
. Again, the feebate has the same effect
as a cost increase (reduction) when the fuel consumption is above (below) e˜.
Policy equivalence
Our objective is to compare standards and feebates when they are equivalent in terms of
fuel efficiency outcome and tax revenue raised. For a given standard policy, we can find an
equivalent feebate (e˜, τ) such that the policy tax revenue is equal to RCAFE =
∑
m Fm and
the average fuel consumption is equal to the industry’s weighted average fuel consumption
under the standard, eCAFE. The tax revenue condition is then
N
J∑
j=1
sj(p)τ(ej − e˜) = RCAFE
together with the policy objective level∑J
j=1 sj(p)ej∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= eCAFE.
Computational details on how to solve for the new equilibrium under the standard and the
feebate and obtain the strict equivalence in terms of fuel consumption outcome and tax
revenue are presented in Appendix A.
New Rules for Fuel Economy Standards
The new U.S. CAFE standards rules in place since 2011 allow manufacturers to trade fuel
consumption levels through the creation of a market for credits.5 Manufacturers with a high
fleet fuel consumption average can opt to buy some of these credits to use as a substitute
for lower fuel consumption vehicles. The equilibrium price of fuel consumption credits is
determined by the equality between demand and supply for those credits. For tractability,
we assume this market is competitive and manufacturers are price-takers. Depending on the
equilibrium price of the credits, it may be profitable for non-constrained manufacturers to
decrease the average fuel consumption through price changes and to collect additional profits
from selling the fuel consumption credits. The manufacturers that are not complying make
an arbitrage between the implicit cost of complying and the price of the credits.
5This is similar to the CO2 cap-and-trade system where a fixed number of permits to offset emissions
−the cap− is allocated among the different polluters. After emissions amounts are realised, producers with
an excess of permits can trade them with the producers in deficit. In our case, if a manufacturer is above the
standard, it is able to sell a number of credits equivalent to its volume of cars sold times the gap between its
mpg fleet average and the standard.
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We assume that all manufacturers must comply with the regulation and cannot pay penal-
ties instead.6 Under a fuel consumption standard with a trading system, the profits of a
manufacturer are:
Πm = N
(∑
j∈Jm
sj(p)(pj − cj) + ρηm
∑
sj(p)
)
,
where ρ is the price of a gallon per 100 miles of fuel consumption traded and ηm represents
the manufacturer’s net supply of compliance credits. If the manufacturer is a net buyer, ηm
is negative. The manufacturer’s problem is:
maxpj,j∈Jm ,ηm Πm(p)
s.t. em(p) + ηm ≤ e¯.
Since the price of credits is exogenous to manufacturers, it implies that manufacturers al-
ways have an incentive to sell their extra credits.7 Therefore, in equilibrium, the inequality
constraint is binding.
3.4 Insights Into the Comparison of the Policies
We first compare the standard and feebate policies under special cases related to the composi-
tion of the manufacturers’ fleets and the possibility to pay a penalty in case of non-compliance.
Then we present the equivalence between the policies when there is a market for credits of
fuel efficiency. Finally, we investigate the difference between simple standards and attribute-
based standards. All proofs can be found in Appendix A. The results rely on the assumption
that there is a unique equilibrium in prices and shadow costs (λ˜m) under the standard and in
prices and feebate parameters (τ, e˜) under the feebate. We also rely on these two preliminary
results:
(i) Under the standard (feebate) regulation prices are increasing in the shadow cost of com-
pliance (feebate rate) for cars with fuel consumption above the standard (feebate pivot point);
and conversely for cars with fuel consumption below the standard (feebate). As a consequence,
price distortions, i.e |pCAFEj − p0j | (respectively |pfeebatej − p0j |) are increasing with the shadow
cost of compliance (feebate rate).
6Allowing manufacturers to pay the penalty instead of complying is equivalent to imposing a cap on the
price in the fuel efficiency level market. This complicates the analysis if the market price is higher than the
penalty.
7We rule out situations where a manufacturer prefers to offer fewer credits in order to increase the market
price.
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(ii) A manufacturer’s average fuel consumption em decreases with respect to the shadow cost
of compliance λ˜m (feebate rate τ) under the standard (feebate) regulation.
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RESULT 1. Symmetric manufacturers and compliance. Suppose all manufacturers
m = 1, ...,M produce the same set of cars and they are initially not complying with the stan-
dard (em > e¯). Suppose also that choosing to pay the fine is not allowed (all manufacturers
must comply). Then the equivalent feebate scheme is such that
1. the pivot point is e˜ = e¯ and
2. the feebate rate is τ = λ˜m = · · · = λ˜M with optimal prices that are identical under both
policies.
This result implies that under this stylized industry configuration the two policies are
strictly equivalent and yield the same producer and consumer surplus.
RESULT 2. Asymmetric manufacturers. Assume a market consisting of two manu-
facturers. Assume that choosing to pay the fine is not allowed. Then
1. if the two manufacturers are initially not complying with the standard: em > e¯, m ∈
{1, 2} and if a firm’s shadow cost of compliance is greater (lower) than the industry’s
average shadow cost, it experiences larger (lower) price distortions under the standard
than under its equivalent feebate, and
2. if a manufacturer is non-constrained (em < e¯), the complier experiences larger price
distortions under the standard regulation than under the equivalent feebate.
This result illustrates the advantage of the feebate over the standard when some man-
ufacturers are non-constrained: the former allows for a compensation from the most fuel
efficient manufacturers to the least fuel efficient ones. The key difference between the stan-
dard and the feebate is that under the standard a non-constrained manufacturer does not
have incentives to become more fuel efficient while the feebate offers incentives to all.
RESULT 3. Optimal decision to pay the fine. If there is only one manufacturer, it
chooses to pay the fine instead of complying if the penalty is lower than the shadow cost of
compliance. If there is more than one manufacturer, the ranking between the shadow cost
and the penalty is not enough to determine whether to comply or pay the fine.
Overall, Results 1-3 illustrate the difficulty to compare theoretically the two policies when
we have simultaneously: (i) heterogeneity of manufacturers including some that are non-
8We show in Appendix A that these two results hold under some conditions.
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constrained, (ii) the possibility to pay fines instead of complying that caps the marginal cost
of compliance, and (iii) imperfect competition in the market.
RESULT 4. Trading system for fuel efficiency. Assume mandatory compliance. Al-
lowing manufacturers to trade fuel consumption credits is equivalent to a feebate scheme with
revenue neutrality, the pivot point is equal to the standard and the feebate rate τ is equal to
the price of the fuel consumption credits ρ.
Allowing manufacturers to trade credits of fuel consumption creates an equivalence between
the CAFE and feebate policies. Indeed, trading allows for the same compensation for the
fuel inefficient manufacturers by the most efficient ones as under the feebate. It induces
non-constrained manufacturers to react directly to the standard because they can increase
their profits by being more fuel efficient and selling more credits.
The new U.S. CAFE standards rules also transformed the regulation into an attribute-
based standard. This is also similar to the new mandatory emissions target reductions regu-
lation in Europe that started in 2015. There, the standard is car-specific: it depends on the
value of the attribute. Concretely, we consider the types of standards implemented in the
U.S. in which each vehicle has a fuel consumption target ψj that is an increasing function of
the footprint wj:
ψj = e¯+ a(wj − w0). (4)
Recall that e¯ is the fuel consumption standard and is measured in gallons per 100 miles
and that the footprint is the area obtained by multiplying the length and the width of the
car. The parameters of this regulation are a and w0 with a > 0 so that larger cars have
higher fuel consumption targets. To keep things simple, we consider w0 to be the initial fleet
average footprint; a is the coefficient of the regression of the car’s fuel consumption on the
footprint. The manufacturer’s constraint is now:∑
j∈J sj(p)ej∑
j∈J sj(p)
≤
∑
j∈J sj(p)ψj∑
j∈J sj(p)
.
RESULT 5. Attribute-based standard. Relative to the simple standard policy, a
footprint-based standard relaxes (tightens) the constraint of a manufacturer that sells cars
with an average footprint above (below) the industry’s average.
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4 Data and Estimation
To simulate the effect of the two alternative regulations, we use demand parameters (price
sensitivity and mean utilities) and marginal costs as inputs. We estimate the demand for cars
for France and the U.S. separately using the nested logit specification presented in Section 3.1.
We then recover marginal costs assuming the prices observed correspond to the competitive
equilibrium described in Section 3.2.
4.1 Data
We use a dataset from the association of French automobile manufacturers (CCFA, Comite´
des Constructeurs Franc¸ais d’Automobiles) that contains all the registrations of new cars
purchased by households in France between 2003 and 2008. Each year, we observe about
one million vehicle registrations that contain the following attributes: brand, model, car-
body style, number of doors, horsepower, CO2 emissions, weight, and fuel energy.
9 These
characteristics have been complemented with average annual fuel prices and the average
euro-dollar exchange rate to compute the cost of driving in dollars for 100 miles. Prices are
also converted from euros to dollars. The monetary variables are deflated to be expressed in
constant 2007 dollars.
For the American market we use data on car characteristics and market shares from J.D.
Power and Associates (JDPA) and from Ward’s Communications covering the period of
2000 through 2007. For each car model we observe the price, weight, horsepower, length,
and width. We combine weight and horsepower into a single measure, acceleration, which
we define as horsepower divided by weight. Since length and width are highly correlated,
we use only length in the demand estimation.10 Gasoline prices were obtained from the
Energy Information Administration. All prices are converted into 2007 dollars using the CPI
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For both countries we use annual market shares
for the estimation.
CAFE standards in the U.S. exist for two categories of cars: passenger cars and light-
duty vehicles. Here we concentrate on the first category as to be able to compare outcomes
across the two countries. The standard for the passenger cars category was 27.5 mpg at the
time covered by our data. After excluding light-duty vehicles (pickups and SUVs) from the
data, we compute the weighted CAFEs for each manufacturer following the harmonic mean
definition. These computed CAFEs are consistently below those reported to the NHTSA
9In France, 67% of new vehicles are diesel powered. Those vehicles are more fuel efficient than their
gasoline counterparts.
10In Copeland et al. [2011] there is also a detailed description of this dataset.
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[2014]. There are two reasons to explain this: the credits earned from the past three years
are added to the final NHTSA reported numbers, and second, the numbers reported to the
NHTSA do not match the EPA numbers (which are the ones we use here), because the two
agencies have different methods to calculate the CAFEs. This issue in the data has been
documented in Klier and Linn [2011].11 Therefore we find an equivalent CAFE standard of
19.1 mpg that matches the compliance nature of all manufacturers except one in our data
with that of the reported status to the NHTSA.12
We present summary statistics on the two markets in Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.
The product choice set and the distribution of market shares are not the same across the two
markets. For instance, while in France the two largest manufacturers by market share are the
domestic brands PSA and Renault (53.1% market share), the two largest manufacturers in
the U.S. are GM and Toyota (with a combined market share of 38.6%).13 Moreover, neither
PSA nor Renault has any significant presence in the U.S. market, but GM and Toyota do have
non-negligible, albeit small, shares in the French market (5.0% and 6.0%, respectively). Thus,
the two markets greatly differ in the distribution of market shares −the U.S. market being
much less concentrated than the French market− as well as in the brands offered in each. In
terms of average fuel efficiency, the French manufacturers offer a higher fuel efficiency range
than the U.S. market, almost by a factor of 2. Moreover, the average standard deviation of
mpg within manufacturers in France is around the level of the highest standard deviation for
the U.S. This is partly explained by the diesel versions, which are more fuel efficient.
We observe 18 different manufacturers in France and 16 in the U.S. In each market we
observe 446 and 430 car models, respectively in 2007. Products are defined by brand, model,
and fuel type in France; we consider two versions of the same model to be different if they use
different types of fuel, otherwise we aggregate the market shares of the versions and select
the characteristics of the most frequently purchased one. For the U.S., cars are defined by
their brand and model name since diesel versions are virtually nonexistent. We group cars
into segments, five in the U.S. (small, middle, large, luxury, and CUV) and eight in France
(supermini, small, large, small MPV, large MPV, executive, sport, and all-road/SUV).
11The authors explain that a car with 35 mpg as reported to the NHTSA has a reported 26 mpg according
to the EPA. This gives a factor of conversion of 1.36, which is very close to the factor of conversion we find
in our data.
12BMW is the exception. Its CAFE of 18.9 is slightly below the implied standard of 19.1 and yet is
complying according to the NHTSA files. We consider that BMW is a payer in 2007 so that our initial data
and manufacturers statuses are consistent with an initial standard of 19.1 mpg.
13PSA is the result of the merger between Peugeot and Citroe¨n.
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4.2 Estimation
Table 1 presents the results for the demand estimation for the French and U.S. markets.
As expected, the price coefficient is negative and the intra-segment correlation σ is between
0 and 1 for both markets. However, the within-segment substitution appears to be more
important in France than in the U.S. Fuel cost has a negative and statistically significant
coefficient in both markets. Consumers are much more sensitive to fuel cost in France than
in the U.S. (−0.21 versus −0.07), which is consistent with the large difference in initial fuel
efficiency of the fleet. Weight and horsepower also have coefficients different from zero and
have positive signs showing positive valuations for these attributes in the French market. A
similar observation applies to the U.S. for the coefficient on acceleration.
Table 1: Demand parameters for the U.S. market
U.S. France
Variable Parameter Std err Parameter Std err
Price −0.83∗∗∗ 0.21 −0.76∗∗∗ 0.10
log sj|g 0.13 0.10 0.30∗∗∗ 0.05
Fuel cost −0.07∗∗∗ 0.03 −0.21∗∗∗ 0.01
Length 0.01∗ 0.01
Acceleration 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
Weight 0.79∗∗∗ 0.24
Horsepower 0.31∗∗∗ 0.04
Coupe −0.42∗∗∗ 0.13
Three doors −0.05 0.10
Wagon -0.08 0.09
Intercept −9.29∗∗∗ 1.23 −5.75∗∗∗ 0.37
Significance levels: ∗: 10% ∗∗: 5% ∗ ∗ ∗: 1%
Notes: The price variable is in $10,000, the weight is in 1,000
kilograms and fuel cost is in dollars per 100 miles. Acceleration
is equal to horsepower/weight. Year and manufacturer fixed ef-
fects are included. The demand model is estimated using 3,383
car-model observations for the U.S. and 2,492 car-model obser-
vations for France. R2 = 0.22 in the U.S. and R2 = 0.68 in
France.
The average price elasticity in 2007 is −2.5 in the U.S. while it is slightly larger in France
with an average of −3.2. These values are consistent with previous studies. For instance, for
the U.S., Train and Winston [2007] find an average elasticity of −2.4 and Berry et al. [1995]
obtain elasticities between −3.5 and −6.5. For France, D’Haultfœuille et al. [2016] find an
average elasticity of −4.5.
We recover marginal costs using the first order conditions presented in Sections 3.2 and
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3.3. Since the CAFE standard policy was already in place in the U.S. for the time period
of our data set, we take into account the penalties paid by BMW, Mercedes, and Porsche
using our equivalent standard of 19.1 mpg. Ford’s average fuel economy (19.3 mpg) is slightly
above the standard in 2007, nevertheless we consider it to be a complier. To separate Ford’s
marginal cost from its shadow cost of compliance, we estimate the following equation
cˆjt = K + λmt(ejt − e¯) +Xjtγ + εjt
where cˆjt are the estimated marginal costs; K is a constant; and Xjt contains fuel consump-
tion, acceleration, length, the squared of these covariates, and brand and year fixed effects.
λmt is the shadow cost of the regulation for manufacturer m at time t when the constraint
is binding and it is equal to 0 for non-constrained manufacturers and payers. We define the
compliers as those manufacturers whose average fuel efficiencies are less than 5% above the
standard. They are: Ford in every year except in 2001 and 2006, and Suzuki in 2002 only.
We obtain a shadow cost of compliance for Ford in 2007 of $179. Then, the shadow cost
is subtracted from the initial marginal cost for Ford. This methodology has been used by
Goldberg [1995] to account for binding quotas on imports of Japanese cars and by Byrne
[2015] to separate the marginal revenues from the price regulation effect for the cable TV
industry.
The demand and cost parameters imply an average markup rate of 42% in the U.S. and
29% in France. In 2007 the initial fuel economy is 40.2 miles per gallon in France while it is
only 21.5 in the U.S. The two markets we analyse here differ in multiple dimensions: market
power, in consumers’ preferences, and in initial fuel efficiency. Introducing the environmental
regulations is then likely to have different impacts in the two markets. This is what we explore
by conducting simulations in the next section.
5 CAFE vs. Feebates: Policy Simulations
We simulate the introduction of the two environmental policies in France and in the U.S.
using market conditions in 2007 following the strategy laid out in Section 3.3. A standard-
type policy is defined by two parameters: the value of the standard e¯ and the penalty φ. The
feebate policy parameters τ and e˜ are determined such that the feebate has the same effects
as the standard policy on fuel efficiency outcome and tax revenues.
5.1 Benchmark Scenarios
We begin our analysis by simulating the effects of relatively lenient and realistic environmental
regulations. We set the value of e¯ to a level of 5% above the initial average mpg of the fleet
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and the penalty φ to 300 dollars per mpg above the standard. It is likely that the cost of not
complying exceeds the amount of the penalty paid by manufacturers, indeed we believe there
are non-monetary costs associated with non-compliance, such as brand image deterioration
and negative advertising.14 Jacobsen [2013] finds that the shadow costs of compliance for
passenger cars are higher than the penalty: 52, 373, and 438 dollars per mpg for Ford,
Chrysler, and GM respectively, with a mean of 288. Gramlich [2009] estimates an overall
value of 347 dollars per mpg. We take a value of φ = 300 which is inspired by these two
estimates. These contrast with the estimates in Anderson and Sallee [2011] which are below
$55. These low estimates in compliance costs were obtained using a different approach that
relies on the existence of a loophole that spanned for a very short period of time.
We consider three scenarios in the U.S.: increases in either the standard or the penalty and
simultaneous increases in both. We also consider the initial CAFE standard in the U.S. and
solve for its equivalent feebate scheme. We only have two scenarios for France corresponding
to the two values chosen for the penalty ($55 and $300 per mpg).
Table 2 shows the outcome of the different scenarios for the standard-type policy and
their equivalent feebate schemes. First, in all the scenarios in which the standard increases,
the resulting average mpg is lower than the standard. This reflects the fact that most
manufacturers prefer to pay the penalty than to comply. The tax revenue depends non-
linearly on the value of the penalty. When the penalty amount is increased by about 6
times, the tax revenue increases approximately by a factor of 4.4 in the U.S. and a factor of
2.6 in France. When we set the penalty value to $300 per mpg, the tax revenue is around
315 million dollars in France and 3.9 billion in the U.S., which mainly reflects the difference
between the U.S. and French market sizes: the U.S. market is indeed more than ten times as
big as France’s.
The initial CAFE standard in the U.S. corresponds to a very low feebate rate (2.9$/mpg)
but a high pivot point (22.7 mpg). Indeed, the pivot point is higher than the standard (19.1
mpg) meaning that some car models that help a manufacturer comply with the policy would
actually be taxed under a feebate regulation. For the 5% case, the rates of the equivalent
feebate schemes appear to be similar in the U.S. and in France (25$/mpg and 40$/mpg when
the penalty is set to $55, and 133$/mpg and 158$/mpg when the penalty is set to $300,
respectively). In both countries, the feebate pivot points are always above the value of the
standard.
14The recent Volkswagen scandal has immediately negatively impacted its sales which have re-
mained stable in October 2015 -despite the increase of manufacturers discounts- as opposed to a
global sales increase of 8% according to abcNEWS (see http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/
diesel-scandal-volkswagens-us-sales-forecast-flat-34662376).
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Table 2: Outcomes and equivalent feebate parameters associated with the benchmark sce-
narios
U.S. France
Initial average mpg 21.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 40.2 40.2
Standard (mpg) 19.1 22.6 19.1 22.6 42.2 42.2
φ ($/mpg) 55 55 300 300 55 300
Results for both policies
Average mpg 21.5 21.6 21.5 21.8 40.5 41.5
Tax revenue (million $) 39.3 864 174 3,923 123 315
Equivalent feebate parameters
τ (feebate rate, $/mpg) 2.9 25 14 133 40.0 158
e˜ (pivot point, in mpg) 22.7 24.7 22.8 24.6 43.1 43.2
Notes: For the U.S., the column with a standard of 19.1 mpg corresponds to the
case with no increase in the standard, all other columns correspond to a standard
equivalent to an increase of 5% on the initial average mpg.
In the U.S. when the penalty is equal to $55, all manufacturers prefer to pay the fine
than to comply. When the penalty increases to $300, BMW prefers to comply to the initial
standard (19.1 mpg) and its shadow cost is equal to 275 $/mpg. In contrast, when the
standard is increased to 22.6 mpg, BMW is better-off by paying the fine. This is because the
penalty is relatively low compared to the price of the cars, especially the fuel inefficient ones
($300 corresponds to 1.3% of the average car price in the U.S.). For the same standard of
22.6 mpg, three manufacturers are ex-ante complying with the regulation and are therefore
non-constrained (Toyota, Honda, and Kia). Three manufacturers have no car models with
a fuel efficiency above the standard: Mercedes, Porsche, and Subaru. These manufacturers
are therefore unable to comply with the regulation and automatically belong to the set of
payers.
Only one manufacturer in France is ex-ante complier (PSA) and three manufacturers do
not produce any vehicle above the standard of 42.2 mpg (Chrysler, Porsche, and Ssangyong).
We obtain a total of 14 payers and 3 compliers in France when the penalty is set to $300
while no manufacturer complies for a penalty of $55.
The estimates of the compliers’ shadow costs λ˜m are, for France: 110$/mpg for Fiat,
120$/mpg for Renault, and 200$/mpg for Toyota. We note that these values are lower than
the value of the penalty. Indeed, in Section 3.4, we show that the choice of complying versus
paying the fine relies partly on a comparison between the value of the penalty and the shadow
cost.
We then compare the welfare consequences of the two policies in the U.S. and France. We
measure the profits, consumer surplus, and welfare. We display two different measures of
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welfare: the first is simply defined as the sum of profits, consumer surplus, and tax revenues
while the second takes into account the value of avoided CO2 emissions per year. For the
latter, we assume 13,765 miles driven per year for the U.S. and for France we assume that
gasoline cars travel 6,284 miles per year and diesel cars travel 10,684 miles per year.15 We
use a social cost of carbon of $36 per ton of carbon emissions.16 We do not take into account
the rebound effect that potentially encourages households to drive more as they buy more
fuel efficient vehicles. However, we allow them to drive more when they switch from gasoline
to diesel in France.
Consumer surplus is measured according to the following expressions. For each car segment,
we compute
vg = (1− σ) log
∑
j∈Jg
exp(δj)
1− σ
and then aggregate over the segments as follows:
CS =
1
α
log
(
1 +
∑
g
exp(vg)
)
,
where α measures the sensitivity to price and was obtained in the demand estimation. In
order to obtain the total consumer surplus in the market we multiply this individual consumer
surplus by the number of households.
Table 3: Welfare effects of the two policies for both countries under the benchmark scenarios
U.S. France
22.6, 55 19.1, 300 22.6, 300 42.2, 55 42.2, 300
S F S F S F S F S F
∆ Sales -0.52 -0.52 -0.12 -0.11 -2.58 -2.48 -0.73 -0.72 -2.8 -2.45
∆ Profits -0.49 -0.48 -0.07 -0.06 -2.61 -2.46 -0.68 -0.66 -2.56 -2.19
∆ CS -0.63 -0.63 -0.15 -0.13 -3.14 -3.03 -0.81 -0.8 -3.09 -2.71
∆ CO2 -0.73 -0.73 -0.2 -0.19 -3.87 -3.78 -1.06 -0.94 -4.3 -3.22
∆ W -0.23 -0.22 -0.06 -0.05 -1.31 -1.18 -0.32 -0.31 -1.77 -1.39
∆ W w/CO2 -0.23 -0.22 -0.06 -0.05 -1.29 -1.16 -0.32 -0.31 -1.76 -1.38
Notes: “W” represents welfare gross of emissions. “W w/CO2” represents welfare net of emissions.
We use a value of 36$/tCO2. All numbers are percentage changes. “S” stands for standard and
“F” for feebate. The first number at the top of each column is the level of the standard in mpg
and the second number is the value of the penalty in $/mpg.
Table 3 provides the variation of sales, profits, consumer surplus, and welfare associated
with the introduction of each of the two environmental regulations. We observe that in the
15For the U.S. see U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration [2009]. For France,
averages were obtained from D’Haultfœuille et al. [2014] who use data from a survey on means of transport
conducted in 2007-2008.
16U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [2016].
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two countries both policies decrease sales, profits, consumer surplus, and welfare. These
effects are rather small because we consider a relatively lenient policy. Indeed, both sales
and profits decrease by around 2.5 to 2.6% for the 5% and the $300 scenario. The feebate
creates less distortions than the standard regulation and less profits and consumer surplus
losses. These effects are the consequence of the feebate’s ability to redistribute the fuel
efficiency levels across manufacturers while the standard regulation forces the redistribution
to occur within individual manufacturers. Total CO2 emissions decrease more under standard
policies than under their equivalent feebates. However, this does not have a significant effect
on the welfare net of emissions and the feebates always dominate their equivalent standard
regulations.17
The benefits of redistribution across manufacturers under the feebate are important in both
markets since the set of car models offered by each manufacturer is rather homogenous in
terms of fuel efficiency. Luxury brands such as BMW, Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, and Porsche
offer very few fuel efficient vehicles and prefer to pay the penalty rather than to comply.
Under the feebate regulation, the fuel inefficiency of these manufacturers is compensated by
the existence of Toyota and Honda in the U.S. and by Renault and PSA in France. The effects
on consumer surplus are rather large because manufacturers exercise high market power and
pass-through the penalty to consumers. In the end, welfare losses gross of CO2 emissions
are not very large (between -1.8% for the standard regulation in France and -1.2% for the
feebate in the U.S. for the 5% and $300 scenario) because the profits and surplus losses are
mitigated by the amount of taxes collected. The tax revenue is large because most of the
affected manufacturers prefer to pay the penalty rather than to comply.
Although the effects on profits at the aggregate level are all negative, they mask hetero-
geneous effects at the individual manufacturer level. By definition of the feebate regulation,
some cars are subsidised, which makes their producers eventually better off. We explore
17Our welfare analysis neglects the impacts of the regulations on the used car market in the medium- and
long-run. Specifically, if fuel inefficient cars become more expensive under the regulations, their lifetimes
increase and this mitigates the fuel efficiency gains. We assess the fuel efficiency in the medium- and long-run
using a simplified model for the used car market. Since we do not have data for the used-car market, we
assume that each year there is a probability θj of scrapping a vehicle of model j as a decreasing function
of its price pj such that θj = bp
κ
j . This closely follows Bento et al. [2009] and Jacobsen [2013]. We assume
a lifetime of seven years for all car models if they are not scrapped and an elasticity κ = −2.9 of the scrap
probability with respect to the price. We calibrate the coefficient b such that the probability of scrapping the
car is 0.06 with a price equal to the overall average level. In each year, we use the same vector of equilibrium
prices (one for each policy) and compute the car model specific probabilities of being scrapped. We do this
analysis for the (5%, $300) scenario in the U.S. Similar to Jacobsen [2013], we find that the gains in fuel
efficiency are smaller than without accounting for the used car market: 1.06% under the standard and 0.99%
under the feebate against 1.3% in the benchmark. We note that the increases in fuel efficiency only differ by
0.07 percentage points across the standard and feebate policies. This suggests that welfare differences would
be also small.
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these distributional effects by analysing the variation of profits by manufacturers under both
regulations for two levels of stringency: standards that correspond to increases in 5% and
10% of the initial average mpg. The penalty φ is set to $300 in both scenarios.
Figure 1 reveals that the ranking of the two policies is heterogeneous across manufacturers
in both countries. In three of the four cases presented, the feebate regulation is preferred
at the two extremes of the fuel efficiency spectrum but not so for the intermediate values.
Indeed, 8 out of 16 manufacturers in the U.S. and 5 out of 18 in France prefer the standard
to the feebate when we consider the standard of 5%. Some manufacturers even increase their
profits under the standard-type regulation while those same manufacturers experience losses
under the feebate. This occurs because the CAFE standard has very strong effects on the
very fuel inefficient manufacturers (Porsche, Mercedes, and BMW for example). The con-
straint imposed by the regulation leads them to loose market share while the manufacturers
that are moderately affected (Hyundai, Honda, and Kia in the U.S.; Toyota, Renault, and
Fiat in France) gain market share. Clearly, the profits of those that are non-constrained by
the standard (Toyota in the U.S. and PSA in France) increase under the two regulations.
Overall the profits increases do not offset the losses of the fuel inefficient manufacturers. The
difference of profits under the two regulations is quite large for the fuel inefficient manu-
facturers when we consider the 5% case. However, under the 10% case, the differences are
negligible for most manufacturers in France. This reflects the fact that all manufacturers are
constrained by such a level of the standard and only PSA complies. Therefore, the equivalent
feebate scheme has a feebate rate close to the penalty ($269) and a pivot point close to the
standard (44.4 mpg against a standard of 43.4 mpg).
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Figure 1: Effects on profits from each policy type by manufacturer
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(b) France, 5%
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(c) U.S., 10%
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Notes: 1a and 1b present the changes in profits by manufacturer for a standard that corresponds to a 5% increase with respect to the initial average
fuel economy of the fleet. Bottom panels 1c and 1d present similar results for an increase of 10%. The vertical lines indicate the level of the
standard and the feebate pivot point. For France we omit four manufacturers, Mitsubishi, Chrysler, Ssangyong, and Porsche. Their profits losses
are between -75% and -30% under the CAFE, and -54% and -21% under the feebate, both corresponding to the 5% increase of the standard. For
the 10% case, profits fall between -79% and -35% under both the standard and the feebate for this set of manufacturers.
5.2 Simulation Analysis for Different Levels of the Regulations
Now we turn our attention to the comparison between the two policies for different levels of
policy stringency. First we fix the penalty parameter φ at 300 dollars per mpg and vary the
standard between 1 and 15%. Then, we keep the standard fixed at 5% and vary the penalty
from 75$ to 1,750$. Figures 2 and 3 present the main results. More details are available in
Appendix B and C.
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Figure 2: Change in mpg and tax revenue amounts by policy instrument and country
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Notes: For the first column, φ = 300$/mpg. In the second column, the standard is set to 5% above
initial mpg.
First, we analyse how the fuel efficiency and the tax revenue change when the policy
stringency levels increase, either through an increase in the standard or through an increase
in the penalty.
We find that the average mpg increases with the stringency of the standard. The curve of
efficiency gains is steeper in France than in the U.S. Increasing the penalty produces steady
efficiency gains in the U.S. while its effect in France has a concave curvature: increasing the
penalty has virtually no effect above $1,000.
The tax revenue per car sold increases rapidly with respect to the level of the standard,
and it is decreasing for high values of the penalty, displaying a bell-shaped curve. This Laffer
curve shows that for penalties above 1,200 dollars in the U.S. and 400 dollars in France,
the tax revenue decreases. These non-linear effects are the result of the switching status of
manufacturers from payer to complier (more details are available in Table B.3 in Appendix
B).
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We analyse further the welfare effects of the different levels of regulation in Figure 3. As
before, we find that both policies always have negative effects on consumer surplus and profits
and both display very similar patterns.18 In France we observe equal welfare effects for values
of the standard of 12% and above. This is because all manufacturers are paying the fine at
those levels and the equivalent feebate scheme has a pivot point equal to the standard and
a feebate rate equal to the penalty. The average consumer surplus decreases up to 7% in
the U.S. and 10% in France for a standard of 15%. The decreases in profits and surplus are
steeper in France than in the U.S. Indeed, increasing the standard is a much more effective
instrument to improve mpg in France than in the U.S. and it is therefore associated with
greater welfare losses. In contrast, the profits and surplus losses are higher in the U.S. when
the penalty increases. We also observe a non-monotonic effect of increasing the penalty on
the profits and surplus variations under the feebate regulation. This is a consequence of the
Laffer curve: less tax revenue is raised under the standard, which implies a more lenient
feebate scheme (the equivalent feebate schemes are detailed in Table B.4 in Appendix B).
Figure 3 also shows that the standard policy is associated with greater profits than the
feebate policy for all the values considered. The gap between the policies is of small magnitude
in the case of an increase in the standard but this gap is larger with increases of the penalty.
In addition, losses in profits are larger in France than in the U.S. for values of the standard
above 7% whereas for increases in the penalty firms in France experience lower losses than
in the U.S. This is a consequence of the fact that the standard is a more effective policy
instrument than the penalty to improve fuel efficiency levels in France while the penalty is
more effective in the U.S.
Even though the aggregate profits are always lower under the standard than under the
feebate in the U.S. and for values of the standard less than 12% in France, this hides het-
erogeneous effects across manufacturers. Tables in Appendix C provide the number of man-
ufacturers that are better off under the standard than under the feebate. In the U.S. we
find that the majority of manufacturers prefer the standard at 5% or below. In France most
manufacturers are better off under the feebate except at values 12% and above where the
two policies become identical.
18See the effects on surplus separately in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.
27
Figure 3: Profits and welfare changes by policy instrument and country
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Notes: For the first column, φ = 300$/mpg. In the second column, the standard is set to 5% above
initial mpg.
As shown in the same Figure, implementing a standard-type policy leads to larger welfare
losses than those seen with a feebate policy, consistent with the previous set of results. For
values of the standard regulation above 12% the two policies are strictly equivalent in France
since in these cases all manufacturers are payers and the feebate rate is equal to the penalty.
The welfare losses from the CAFE standard are on average 1.1 times larger than those under
the feebate policy in the U.S. and up to 1.7 times larger than under the feebate in France.
This ratio decreases with the level of the standard in both countries.
Gross welfare is about 28.4 billion dollars in France and about 242.5 billion in the U.S.
initially. Welfare monotonically decreases as the stringency of the policies increases. The
differences in welfare between the two policies are non-negligible: up to 391 million dollars
in the U.S. and up to 119 million dollars in France. CO2 emissions account in most cases for
an amount between 0.3 and 0.8% of the gross welfare.
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In terms of emissions, the feebate is dominated most of the time by the standard.19 This is
explained in part by a quantity effect, in which the number of vehicles sold is greater under
the feebate than under the standard. There is also a fleet composition effect since the average
emissions per car is always larger under feebates. Despite the presence of diesel cars in France
and the increase of their share with more stringent policy levels, their effect on emissions is
small because higher number of miles driven from these vehicles offset the decrease in fuel
consumption.
5.3 Trade-off Between the Penalty and the Standard
Under the CAFE-type regulation, both the level of the standard and the penalty can be
used by the policy-maker to increase the average fuel efficiency of the fleet. We investigate
the trade-off between those two policy parameters. Our framework enables us to find all the
combinations that yield the same level of average mpg in the market.
To implement this, we fix the level of fuel efficiency standard and search for the level of
the penalty that implements a given target level of average mpg. We carry out this exercise
by setting the targets to the average fuel efficiency levels obtained from the standards of
1%, 5%, and 10% above the initial mpg of the fleet. In Figure 4 each line represents the
combinations of the two policy parameters that yield the same average fuel efficiency level of
the fleet. The downward sloping nature of these curves confirms the trade-off between the two
parameters. For each of the targets, we also find the points where consumer surplus, profits,
tax revenue, and welfare gross of emissions are maximised. The pattern of the location of
maximum consumer surplus and profits is to the left of the curves for all targets except for
the lowest target in the U.S. where this point lies slightly to the right. The maximisation
of the tax revenue always occurs at the highest values of the standard in France. In the
U.S., tax revenue is maximised close to the highest values of the standard considered. In
France maximum welfare is obtained in the middle range of the standard and penalty values,
whereas in the U.S. these points are found at the lowest levels of the standard.
19For the full results on CO2 emissions, see Figure C.1 in Appendix C.
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Figure 4: Combinations of policy parameters for the CAFE standard
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Notes: Each curve is associated with the target of fuel efficiency indicated in mpg which corresponds
to the level obtained from the 1, 5, and 10% standards.
5.4 The New 2011 CAFE Standards
Trading of Credits
We investigate the effects of allowing manufacturers to trade fuel efficiency levels in a market
for credits. We rule out the possibility to pay the penalty, thus there is no tax revenue
RCAFE = 0 and eCAFE = e¯, i.e. the standard is exactly implemented. In Section 3.4 we showed
that such a market for credits is strictly equivalent to a feebate with revenue neutrality and
where the pivot point e˜ is equal to e¯, therefore we only need to solve for the feebate rate τ .
The feebate rates are higher than in the benchmark scenario: we obtain $169 for the U.S.
and $171 for France and $133 and $158 when trade is not allowed. The feebate pivot points
are lower: 21.8 mpg against 24.6 mpg for the U.S. and 41.5 mpg against 43.2 mpg for France.
This implies that fewer cars are subject to a tax and more cars receive the subsidy.
As Table 4 shows, this modified CAFE regulation dominates the basic standard and the
feebate in terms of sales, profits, and consumer surplus. This comes at a cost of higher
emissions and no tax revenue. Overall welfare losses are the smallest when trading is allowed
in both countries.
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Table 4: Comparison of the benchmark, the standard with credits, and attribute-based
scenarios for the U.S. and France
U.S. France
AB AB
S F ST S F S F ST S F
Average mpg 21.82 21.82 21.82 21.75 21.75 41.5 41.5 41.5 42.1 42.1
Tax revenue 3,923 3,923 0 3,617 3,617 315 315 0 31 31
∆ Sales -2.58 -2.48 -0.17 -2.38 -2.3 -2.8 -2.45 -0.77 -2.1 -2.1
∆ Profits -2.61 -2.46 -0.07 -2.3 -2.22 -2.56 -2.19 -0.46 -1.67 -1.67
∆ CS -3.14 -3.03 -0.21 -2.9 -2.81 -3.09 -2.71 -0.85 -2.32 -2.32
∆ CO2 -3.87 -3.78 -1.5 -3.38 -3.3 -4.3 -3.22 -1.55 -1.13 -1.13
∆ W -1.31 -1.18 -0.16 -1.17 -1.07 -1.77 -1.39 -0.69 -1.94 -1.94
∆ W (w/CO2) -1.29 -1.16 -0.15 -1.15 -1.05 -1.76 -1.38 -0.69 -1.95 -1.95
Notes: All numbers are in percentages except for the first two rows. Tax revenues are
in millions of dollars. “W” represents welfare gross of emissions. “W w/CO2” represents
welfare net of emissions. We use a value of 36$/tCO2. “AB” stands for attribute-based, “S”
for standard, “F” for feebate, and “ST” for standard with trading.
Attribute-based Regulation
We model an attribute-based standard that takes a similar form as that in the U.S. and the
European Union. In the U.S., the standard is based on the footprint but since this variable
is missing we use the length instead and the weight in France. Specifically, each vehicle has
a fuel consumption target that is an increasing function of the attribute wj according to
equation (4).
The equivalent feebate scheme has the following form:
fj = τ (ej − (e˜+ a(wj − w0)))
where w0 is the sales-weighted mean of the attribute and a is the coefficient obtained from a
regression of fuel consumption on the attribute.20 We keep the values of a and w0 constant
across the standard and feebate policies and solve for the values of τ and e˜ that implement
the same average fuel economy and the same tax revenue as before.
Table 4 shows the output for this type of policy in each country. Consistent with our
previous findings, the feebate policy causes lower welfare losses than the CAFE standard
even with an attribute-based format. It is more difficult to compare the attribute-based
standard to the basic standard regulation as the fuel efficiency level attained and tax revenue
are different. The attribute-based standard in the U.S. leads to fuel efficiency improvements
in between those associated with a simple standard of 2% and 3%. The welfare losses are
20In the U.S., w0 = 185 and a = 0.049. In France w0 = 127 and a = 0.01.
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comparable to those of simple standards and feebates. In France, fuel efficiency gains from
the attribute-based standard correspond to those from the 8% simple standard. Also, the
attribute-based standard and feebate clearly dominate the simple standard of 8% and its
equivalent feebate in terms of welfare. This constrasts with Reynaert [2015], who finds that
a flat standard is welfare-improving upon an attribute-based standard when manufacturers
are forced to comply by modifying prices.
5.5 Extensions
We consider three extensions. The first two consist of specific technological improvements
that could be adopted in the short- and medium-run: the imports into the U.S. of models
only sold in France and the introduction of hybrid versions of existing models. Lastly we
compare our policies against a fuel tax.
Technological Improvements: Imports of European Car Models
In this scenario we make the following assumptions. First, manufacturers import vehicles
that are sold in France and not sold in the U.S. (e.g. Mercedes Class A). We allow this only
for manufacturers that already sell in both markets. We rule out the possibility to import a
more fuel efficient version of an existing car model (e.g. Volkswagen Passat) or a new brand
(e.g. Smart). Second, we only allow manufacturers that are directly affected by the standard
regulation (i.e. the compliers and the payers) to import new car models. We also restrict
the models imported to be those with a gasoline engine and that have an mpg above the
standard.21
We obtain a total of 44 car models that are eligible under our assumptions (see Table B.5
in Appendix B for the complete listing of the models imported). We further assume that the
transportation costs are 10% of the value of marginal costs.22 We compute the mean utilities
of the imported car models using our demand estimates for the U.S. Since the characteristic
length is missing in the French data, we impute the average length instead. We also set the
unobserved characteristics (ξ) to their value in France. We first simulate the new market
equilibrium in the U.S. when the 44 new car models are available to consumers in addition
to the existing ones.23 The average predicted price of these imported cars is about $30,000
21We only perform this simulation for the U.S. as it is not sensible for manufacturers in France to import
American car models that are generally less fuel efficient.
22This fraction is inspired by a technical report on costs in the automobile manufacturing industry (see
Vyas et al. [2000]).
23Manufacturers always have an incentive to import the 44 French vehicles because of the logit nature of
the demand model. We checked empirically that these changes have a positive impact on profits relative to
the baseline.
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in the U.S. market compared to an average of $27,000 in France. These cars turn out to be
on average more expensive in the U.S. than in France because their marginal costs are larger
due to the transportation costs.
Table 5: Comparison of the benchmark, the imports, the hybrids, and the gas tax scenarios
for the U.S.
Benchmark Imports Hybrids Gas tax
S F Initial S F Initial S F T1 T2 T3
Mean mpg 21.82 21.82 21.56 21.86 21.86 21.74 21.98 21.98 21.82 21.55 21.55
Tax revenue 3,923 3,923 38 3,782 3,782 16 3,683 3,683 3,950 647 632
∆ Sales -2.58 -2.48 0.27 -2.2 -2.1 0.85 -1.3 -1.19 -19.08 -2.45 -2.39
∆ Profits -2.61 -2.46 0.29 -2.25 -2.1 0.83 -1.42 -1.27 -19.56 -2.49 -2.42
∆ CS -3.14 -3.03 0.33 -2.68 -2.56 1.05 -1.59 -1.45 -22.39 -2.99 -2.92
∆ CO2 -3.87 -3.78 0.09 -3.71 -3.61 -0.14 -3.32 -3.22 -28.99 -3.87 -3.78
∆ W -1.31 -1.18 0.31 -0.95 -0.82 0.95 -0.01 0.13 -19.55 -2.52 -2.46
∆ W (w/ CO2) -1.29 -1.16 0.32 -0.93 -0.8 0.95 0.02 0.16 -19.47 -2.51 -2.45
Imports/Hybrids 0.5 0.65 0.57 4.82 5.15 5.6
Notes: All numbers are in percentages except for the first two rows. Tax revenues are in millions of dollars. “W” represents welfare
gross of emissions. “W w/CO2” represents welfare net of emissions. We use a value of 36$/tCO2. “Initial” stands for the initial
regulation level, “S” for standard, “F” for feebate. “T1” stands for the gas tax that leads to the same average fuel efficiency
(31.6%),“T2” for the gas tax that causes the same reduction in CO2 emissions as the benchmark standard (3.83%), and “T3” for
a gas tax that causes the same reduction in CO2 emissions as the benchmark feebate (3.74%).
The imports of French car models increase the initial average fuel efficiency by 0.04 mpg
relative to the 2007 standard situation as shown in Table 5. Their market share accounts
for 0.5%, a rather low level because these cars have characteristics−high fuel efficiency, low
horsepower−that are not highly valued by American consumers and their prices are compa-
rable to the average price of already existing cars in the U.S.
With an increase in the standard and its equivalent feebate policy we obtain higher market
shares of imports (0.65% and 0.57% respectively). The average fuel efficiency is higher and
the tax revenue is smaller compared to the benchmark scenario. Allowing for imports changes
Hyundai’s status to compliance with a shadow cost of $207.
The feebate rate is slightly lower ($134 against $132) and the pivot point is the same as
before (24.6 mpg). The profits, consumer surplus, and welfare losses are lower. Specifically,
total welfare (including CO2 emissions) decreases by 0.93% (versus 1.3% without the imports)
under the standard and by 0.8% (versus 1.2%) under the feebate regulation.
Technological Improvements: Introduction of New Hybrid Vehicles
Hybrid vehicles −with both an internal combustion engine and an electric propulsion system-
have significantly grown in market share in recent years, up to about 3% in the U.S. in 2015.24
The success of hybrid vehicles started with the Prius XW10, released at the end of 2000
worldwide. These cars are more fuel efficient than their gasoline only fueled counterparts.
For a manufacturer, selling more hybrids can be a strategy to facilitate compliance when the
24http://www.afdc.energy.gov/data/10301
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standard becomes more stringent.25 We consider a scenario in which manufacturers with a
fleet average above the standard release a hybrid version of their top selling model. This
is allowed only for manufacturers that do not have any hybrid model in their fleet. Those
models are listed in Table B.6 in Appendix B.
We make the following assumptions for the characteristics of these new hybrid models:
the fuel efficiency (in mpg) increases by 70%, the marginal cost increases by 50%, and the
horsepower decreases by 25%. These are roughly the average ratios of the current hybrid
models’ characteristics and their corresponding non-hybrid versions’ characteristics in the
U.S.
Table 6: Compliers’ shadow costs under the benchmark and hybrids scenarios (in $/mpg)
France
Manufacturer Benchmark Hybrid
Fiat 110
Ford 157
Renault 120 62
Toyota 200 202
Releasing new hybrid models appears to be an effective solution to remove the constraint
imposed by the regulations: six manufacturers are non-constrained by the standard in the
U.S. as opposed to the benchmark scenario in which only Toyota is non-constrained. This
manufacturer does not take advantage of this technological improvement because it already
has hybrid models in its fleet. In France, Fiat joins PSA in the non-constrained manufacturers
set and Ford is now a complier (see Table 6). Renault’s shadow cost of compliance is reduced
by half while Toyota’s slightly increases because this manufacturer already had hybrid vehicles
in its fleet and its competitors become less constrained. The equivalent feebate schemes are
barely affected, in the U.S. the pivot point marginally decreases whereas in France the feebate
rate decreases by $21 but the pivot point slightly increases (43.31 against 43.19 mpg).
Assuming that our two policies encourage the introduction of more hybrid models, we find
the feebate to be welfare-improving in both countries. In terms of emissions, the effects are
different in each country: at the initial level of the policy there is a decrease of 0.14% in the
U.S. whereas in the no policy scenario in France emissions are reduced by 6.83% (see Tables
5 and 7.
The modest decrease in the U.S. is explained by the increase in aggregate sales which
partly compensates for the increase in fuel efficiency. The pronounced reduction in France is
25For instance, in March 2016 Porsche announced that all its car models will be available in a hybrid
version, including the Porsche 911. Also in 2016, BMW released the 330e, a hybrid version of the Series 3.
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due to two factors: (i) the fuel efficiency gains in France are larger than in the U.S. and (ii)
French consumers drive less in average than their American counterparts so the increase in
sales does not translate into a large increase in emissions.
Table 7: Comparison of the benchmark, the hybrids, and the gas tax scenarios for France
Benchmark Hybrids Gas tax
S F Initial S F T1 T2 T3
Mean mpg 41.5 41.5 40.47 41.64 41.64 41.5 40.35 40.32
Tax revenue 315 315 0 272 272 149 23 17
∆ Sales -2.8 -2.45 1.19 -1.26 -0.87 -31.74 -3.81 -2.85
∆ Profits -2.56 -2.19 1.06 -1.21 -0.81 -32.08 -3.87 -2.9
∆ CS -3.09 -2.71 0 -1.4 -0.96 -33.96 -4.2 -3.15
∆ CO2 -4.3 -3.22 -6.83 -11.35 -11.04 -35.12 -4.3 -3.22
∆ W -1.77 -1.39 0.43 -0.36 0.06 -32.67 -3.99 -2.99
∆ W (w/ CO2) -1.76 -1.38 0.46 -0.32 0.09 -32.66 -3.99 -2.99
% Hybrids 2.28 3.02 2.86
Notes: All numbers are in percentages except for the first two rows. Tax revenues are in
millions of dollars. “W” represents welfare gross of emissions. “W w/CO2” represents
welfare net of emissions. We use a value of 36$/tCO2. “Initial” stands for the initial
situation without policy, “S” for standard, “F” for feebate. “T1” stands for the gas tax
that leads to the same average fuel efficiency (14.5%),“T2” for the gas tax that causes
the same reduction in CO2 emissions as the benchmark standard (1.5%), and “T3” for
a gas tax that causes the same reduction in CO2 emissions as the benchmark feebate
(1.11%).
Comparison with a Fuel Tax
In the broader context of environmental regulation, we compare our two policies against a
simple fuel tax. Specifically, we solve for the fuel tax levels that yield the same average fuel
efficiency as the CAFE standard and feebate and the same reduction in total CO2 emissions.
We assume the same taxation rate for diesel and gasoline.26 We set the elasticity of driving
with respect to gas prices at −0.35 in both countries.27 To obtain the same average fuel
efficiency, we need to impose a fuel tax of 31.6% in the U.S. and 14.5% in France. The
tax levels are very high because the choice of car model is not very sensitive to gas prices.
Furthermore, there is a large difference in the sensitivity to the cost of driving across countries;
French consumers react much more to higher fuel prices than the American consumers. Note
however that the gas price in the U.S would still be lower than the fuel prices in France
which are initially about twice as high. Since both the standard and feebate regulations
26Taxation rates are actually different for diesel and gasoline in France but here we consider an additional
uniform tax on the final prices.
27See for instance Parry and Small [2005] and Parry et al. [2007].
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imply different CO2 emissions reduction levels, we solve for the fuel taxes that equalize both
levels. We find 3.8% and 3.7% for the U.S. and 1.5% and 1.1% for France. Once again, the
equivalent tax levels are lower in France because there consumers are more sensitive to the
cost of driving. Outcomes of the gas tax equivalent scenarios are displayed in Tables 5 and 7.
These equivalent taxes put in perspective our findings on welfare changes under the feebate
and the CAFE standard.
6 Conclusion
We develop a framework to make comparisons between CAFE and feebate policies. We
constrain the fuel efficiency outcome and the tax revenue to be identical under the two alter-
native regulations, and measure the effects on profits and consumer surplus. We consistently
find that feebate policies welfare-dominate CAFE standard policies for both countries and
for different levels of stringency. At a disaggregate level, however, more manufacturers are
better off under the fuel economy standard than under the feebate.
This analysis focuses on short-term equilibrium effects, where only prices and demand
change after the introduction of a new regulation. However, it is likely that the two envi-
ronmental regulations provide incentives for manufacturers to modify their fleet composition,
either to avoid the constraint of the standard or to take advantage of the rebate in the feebate
case. These medium- and long-run effects include the introduction of new car models, the
modification of the characteristics of existing models, and mergers with more fuel efficient
manufacturers. Our work could serve as the basis for these and other extensions.
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Appendix A: Comparing the Policies
Computational Details
Our objective is to simulate and compare the effects of the two policies described in the main
text by keeping the environmental outcome and the tax revenue identical. We accomplish
this by first fixing the fuel economy standard e¯ and the penalty φ. We then solve for the
optimal reaction of the manufacturers and the new equilibrium prices and market shares. We
obtain the environmental outcome, which is the average mpg attained, and the tax revenue,
which is the total amount of fines paid by manufacturers. In a second step, we use these
outcome values as input for the feebate policy and solve for the feebate scheme parameters
(τ and e˜) that implement the same outcome together with optimal prices.
Solving the system of first order conditions to obtain the new equilibrium prices is chal-
lenging for two reasons. First, in the standard-type regulation, manufacturers have the choice
to comply or to pay the penalty which introduces discontinuities in the reaction functions
of manufacturers. Second, the system of equations defining optimal solutions for new prices
under the two regulations is non-linear because prices enter the market share function, which
has a logit form, and its derivatives. Thus, there is no closed form solution for prices and we
have to use numerical methods to solve for them.
In order to obtain an initial guess for the prices, and to identify the status of each manufac-
turer, we consider an approximated solution for optimal prices that only depends on initial
prices and the car’s fuel consumption.
p∗j = p
0
j + λm
(ej−e¯)∑
sj
if the manufacturer is a complier,
p∗j = p
0
j + φ(ej − e¯) if the manufacturer is a payer,
p∗j = p
0
j if the manufacturer is non-constrained.
For the simulation of the feebate policy, the approximated expression for optimal prices is
p∗j = p
0
j + τ(ej − e˜)
where p0j is the initial price of car model j. This amounts to make the following approximation:[
Ω−1(p∗)S(p∗)
]
j
=
[
Ω−1(p0)S(p0)
]
j
.
In other words, this approximation implies that the markup term does not change because
of the regulation and the cost of the regulation is entirely passed-through to the prices.
We use this simplified problem to solve for the status of manufacturers in the standard-type
regulation environment and to get a good starting point to solve for the entire problem.
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In order to determine the manufacturers status, we start by solving the simplified problem
assuming all the manufacturers are compliers (except those that cannot comply when they
do not sell any vehicle below the standard). Then for each manufacturer, from the most
affected to the least affected (this is measured by the λ˜ms), we can see whether it would be
better off to unilaterally deviate and pay the fines instead of complying. As we go down the
list, the statuses get updated. There might be multiple feebate schemes (τ , e˜) that achieve
the same tax revenue and fuel efficiency level. We select only feebates for which the pivot
point is the closest to the standard.
Proofs
Proof of the preliminary results. We provide the proof in the case of the standard, the same
logic applies for the feebate regulation.
Let f(λ˜,p) = 0 be the vector-valued function that represents the first order conditions
s(p)−Ω(p)(c + λ˜(e− e¯)) + Ω(p)p = 0. Recall that the element (i, j) of Ω is ∂sj
∂pi
if i and j
belong to the same manufacturer and zero otherwise, assume the value of these derivatives
fixed. If the matrix Dfp (defined below) is invertible at a point (λ˜,p) then, by the implicit
function theorem, there exists a function g such that p = g(λ˜) at that point and the effect
of a change of λ˜ on p is Dg = −(Dfp)−1Dfλ˜.
Dfλ˜ is a column vector where the j-th entry is equal to the derivative of the j-th first order
condition with respect to λ˜: −∑l ∂sl∂pj (el− e¯). Dfp is a J × J matrix where the entry (j, l) is
equal to the derivative of the j-th FOC with respect to pl:
∂sj
∂pl
+ ∂sl
∂pj
. The first term forms a
diagonally dominant matrix.28 The second term is the first term multiplied by the ownership
matrix and it is also diagonally dominant.29 Therefore, by ignoring the off-diagonal terms,
which are quadratic terms of market shares in both matrices, their sum is the diagonal matrix
2× diag
([
∂sj
∂pj
])
. Then, the j-th entry of the vector-valued function Dg is
∂pj
∂λ˜
= −
−∑l ∂sl∂pj (el − e¯)
2
∂sj
∂pj
=
1
2
(ej − e¯) +
∑
l 6=j
∂sl
∂pj
(el − e¯)
2
∂sj
∂pj
=
1
2
(ej − e¯) +O(s.). (5)
The symbol O(s.) represents all the terms that depend linearly or on higher powers of market
shares. To see this is the case, we used the expressions of partial derivatives for our nested
28The sum of all market shares including that of the outside option is 1, then by taking the derivative
with respect to one of the prices we get
∑J
l=0
∂sl
∂pj
= 0. Since
∂sj
∂pj
< 0 and ∂sl∂pj ≥ 0 for l 6= j, by removing the
term from the outside good we must have
∑J
l=1
∂sl
∂pj
< 0 or simply
∑J
l 6=j
∂sl
∂pj
< − ∂sj∂pj .
29By multiplying by the ownership matrix, there are fewer positive terms in each row, which preserves the
inequality for diagonal dominance.
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logit demand model:
∂sl
∂pj
=

−αsl
(
1
1−σ − σ1−σsl|g − sl
)
for j = l,
αsj
(
σ
1−σsl|g + sl
)
, for l and j in the same nest, and
αsjsl otherwise,
and observe that if l and j are in the same nest the fraction ∂sl
∂pj
/
∂sj
∂pj
is
σsl|g + (1− σ)sl
−1 + σsj|g + (1− σ)sj ≤
max{sl|g, sl}
−1 + σsj|g + (1− σ)sj
since σ ≤ 1. In the case where j and l are in different nests we have
(1− σ)sl
−1 + σsj|g + (1− σ)sj .
In both cases we obtain an expression that resembles the function x
x−1 which has a Taylor
expansion around zero equal to −x − x2 − x3 − · · · . Since powers of market shares are no
greater than the linear term, we assume that those fractions are O(s.). These are the factors
that multiply each of the terms 1
2
(el − e¯) in the sum above.
Since market shares are very small in our setting (we have outside good market shares of
67% and 81% and 430 and 446 products in the U.S. and France, respectively) O(s.) is also
very small and the term 1
2
(ej − e¯) dominates.
Therefore,
∂pj
∂λ˜
≈ 1
2
(ej−e¯) and the variation in prices pCAFEj −p0j ≈ λ˜2 (ej−e¯), which indicates
that price distortions increase with λ˜.
We also have that,
∂sj
∂λ˜
=
∑
l∈J
∂sj
∂pl
∂pl
∂λ˜
=
∂sj
∂pj
×
(
1
2
(ej − e¯) +O(s.)
)
+
∑
l 6=j
∂sj
∂pl
×
(
1
2
(el − e¯) +O(s.)
)
≈ 1
2
∂sj
∂pj
(ej − e¯)
since, as before,
∂sj
∂pj
dominates the terms
∂sj
∂pl
for l 6= j. Therefore, ∂sj
∂λ˜
has the opposite sign
of ej − e¯.
Finally, observe that
∂em
∂λ˜
=
∑
(ej − em)∂sj∂λ˜∑
sj
≈
∑
(ej − em)(ej − e¯) ∂sj∂pj
2
∑
sj
where in the last expression we used the approximation found for
∂sj
∂λ˜
above and all the sums
are over j ∈ Jm. Since compliers have a fuel consumption meeting the standard exactly,
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em = e¯ and:
∂em
∂λ˜
≈
∑
(ej − e¯)2 ∂sj∂pj
2
∑
sj
< 0.
A similar result can be obtained for ∂em
∂τ
by replacing the shadow cost λ˜ with the feebate
rate τ and the standard e¯ with the pivot point e˜.
Proof of RESULT 1
Under the standard regulation, the market equilibrium consisting of prices p1, ..., pJ and
shadow costs λ1, ..., λm satisfies the system of equations{
pk = ck + λm
ek−e¯
sm(p)
− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k ∈ Jm, m = 1, ...,M∑
j∈Jm ejsj(p)
sm(p)
= e¯ ∀m = 1, ...,M
where S(p) and Ω(p) are defined by the demand equations and sm =
∑
j∈Jm sj is the sum
of manufacturer m’s market shares.
Since all manufacturers are identical to each other, λ1 = · · · = λm ≡ λ and s1(p) = ... =
sM(p) ≡ s(p).30 Furthermore, in equilibrium each manufacturer’s average fuel consumption
em is equal to the standard so that the average fuel efficiency of the market is also equal to
e¯ and the equilibrium (p1, ..., pJ , λ) is a solution to the simplified system of equations: pk = ck + λ
ek−e¯
s(p)
− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯.
Under the equivalent feebate regulation, the equilibrium prices p1, ..., pJ and feebate pa-
rameters (τ, e˜) satisfy the system of equations:
pk = ck + τ(ek − e˜)− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯∑J
j=1 τsj(p)(ej − e˜) = 0.
The last equation represents the zero tax revenue condition and combining it with the fuel
consumption outcome equation (second line) implies that e˜ = e¯. The system of equations
that define (p1, ..., pJ , τ) simplifies to: pk = ck + τ(ek − e¯)− [Ω
−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯.
30We rule out asymmetric equilibria as the symmetric equilibrium exists and we assumed uniqueness of
equilibrium.
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We can make a change of variable and define τ˜ = τs(p) and solve for (p1, ..., pJ , τ˜) such that: pk = ck + τ˜
(ek−e¯)
s(p)
− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯.
This system of equations is identical to the system of equations obtained for the standard
regulation. By the assumption of a unique equilibrium, the two policies lead to the same
prices and the feebate parameter τ is equal to λ
s(p)
.
Proof of RESULT 2.1
Consider firm 1 and firm 2 with shadow costs of compliance λ˜1 = λ1/s
(1), λ˜2 = λ2/s
(2)
such that λ˜2 < λ˜1, where s
(1) and s(2) are the manufacturers’ total market shares. es1 and e
s
2
denote their fuel consumption averages under the standard and are exactly equal to e¯.
The feebate scheme that implements the same fuel consumption outcome and tax revenue
is e˜ = e¯ and τ ∈ (λ˜2, λ˜1).31
Indeed, if τ = λ˜2, e
f
1 > e
s
1 = e¯ and e
f
2 = e
s
2 = e¯, where e
f
1 and e
f
2 denote the fuel
consumption averages under the feebate. Thus, the feebate generates a fleet average fuel
consumption which is above the one from the standard. Conversely, if τ = λ˜1, e
f
1 = e
s
1 = e¯
and ef2 < e
s
2 = e¯. Thus, the feebate implements an average fuel consumption which is below
the one from the standard. This is why the feebate rate τ that implements the exact same
average fuel consumption is between λ˜2 and λ˜1. Since price distortions are increasing in
the shadow cost and the feebate rate (see preliminary result), Firm 1’s prices have larger
distortions under the standard than under the feebate and conversely for Firm 2.
Proof of RESULT 2.2
Assume now that one of the two manufacturers is non-constrained, es2 < e¯. Under the
standard, es1 = e¯ and the average fuel consumption e
CAFE is between es2 and e¯. To obtain
the same fuel consumption outcome under the feebate, we must have τ < λ˜1. Indeed, if
τ ≥ λ˜1, ef1 ≤ e¯ and ef2 < es2 so the average fuel consumption is below eCAFE. Since price
distortions are increasing in the shadow cost and the feebate rate (see preliminary result),
price distortions for compliers are lower under the feebate than under the standard.
Proof of RESULT 3
Case 1 - Single manufacturer. Under compliance, the optimal prices pk, k ∈ Jm and its
31As in the previous proof, e˜ = e¯ since we have no tax revenue by forcing manufacturers to comply.
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adjusted shadow cost of compliance λ˜ are:{
pk = ck + λ˜(ek − e¯)− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k ∈ Jm∑
j∈Jm ejsj(p)∑
j∈Jm sj(p)
= e¯
and if the manufacturer chooses to pay the fine, optimal prices satisfy:
pk = ck + φ(ek − e¯)−
[
Ω−1(p)S(p)
]
k
∀k ∈ Jm
If the policy instrument is φ = λ˜ = λ/s, then the two systems of equations are identical
under the two statuses. By uniqueness of equilibrium, the prices are identical. If φ > λ˜
then the prices are more distorted by paying the fine (see preliminary result) therefore the
manufacturer prefers to comply.
Case 2 - Multiple manufacturers. Let ωk = −[Ω−1S]k be the margin for product k. We use
the superindices comp and payer to denote the complier and the payer status respectively.
Profits for manufacturer m under compliance are
Πcompm =
∑
k∈Jm
scompk (p
comp
k − ck)
=
∑
k∈Jm
scompk (ck + λ˜m(ek − e¯) + ωcompk − ck)
=
∑
k∈Jm
scompk ω
comp
k + λ˜m
∑
k∈Jm
(skek − ske¯).︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 because of compliance
Profits when it is a payer are:
Πpayerm =
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk (p
payer
k − ck)−
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk φ(em − e¯)
=
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk (φ(ek − e¯) + ωpayerk )−
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk φ(em − e¯)
=
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk ω
payer
k +
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk φ(ek − e¯)−
∑
k∈Jm
spayerk φ(em − e¯).︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Both expressions for profits do not depend directly on λ˜m or φ but only through their effects
on market shares and margins. The magnitude of these effects depends on the substitution
patterns between products and strategic interactions. Therefore the comparison between the
two profits is context specific.
Proof of RESULT 4
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Under the standard with trading, optimality conditions for car prices are:
pk = ck + ρ(ek − e¯)− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J
and the equilibrium price of credits ρ is such that the sum of the credits demanded is equal
to the number of credits supplied:∑
m sm(p)
(∑
j∈Jm sj(p)ej∑
j∈Jm sj(p)
− e¯
)
= 0
⇒ ∑m (∑j∈Jm sj(p)ej − sm(p)e¯) = 0
⇒ ∑Jj=1 sj(p) (ej − e¯) = 0
⇒
∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯.
The equilibrium prices of cars p1, ..., pJ and price of credits ρ under the standard with
trading satisfy the following system of equations: pk = ck + ρ(ek − e¯)− [Ω
−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯.
Under the feebate regulation with revenue neutrality, the equilibrium prices p1, ..., pJ and
feebate parameters (τ, e˜) satisfy the system of equations:
pk = ck + τ(ek − e˜)− [Ω−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯∑J
j=1 τsj(p)(ej − e˜) = 0
The two last equations imply that e˜ = e¯. The system of equations that define (p1, ..., pJ , τ)
simplifies to:  pk = ck + τ(ek − e¯)− [Ω
−1(p)S(p)]k ∀k = 1, ..., J∑J
j=1 ejsj(p)∑J
j=1 sj(p)
= e¯
Therefore, the two systems of equations that we obtain for the standard with trading and
the feebate are identical. By the uniqueness of the solution to each system of equations, we
have τ = ρ, the equilibrium prices p1, ..., pJ are identical and we have full equivalence of the
two policies.
Proof of RESULT 5
The constraint of a complier m under the footprint-based standard is:∑
j∈Jm sjej∑
j∈Jm sj
=
∑
j∈Jm sjψj∑
j∈Jm sj∑
j∈Jm sjej∑
j∈Jm sj
=
∑
j∈Jm sj(e¯+a(wj−w0))∑
j∈Jm sj
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⇒
∑
j∈Jm sjej∑
j∈Jm sj
− e¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
simple standard constraint
−a
(∑
j∈Jm sjwj∑
j∈Jm sj
− w0
)
= 0
Therefore, a manufacturer’s simple standard constraint is relaxed when its own footprint
average is larger than that of the fleet, and vice versa.
Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table B.1: Manufacturers’ initial characteristics in the U.S. market for 2007. Fuel economy
expressed as harmonic mean.
Manufacturer Sales Market share Mean fuel economy Std. dev. # of
(in 1,000) (in %) (in mpg) (in mpg) car models
GM 1885.32 19.87 20.4 3.3 73
Toyota 1774.17 18.7 25.8 10.9 40
Ford 1179.71 12.43 19.7 4.2 75
Honda 1094.92 11.54 23 10.1 32
Chrysler 716.89 7.56 20.1 3.6 28
Nissan 701.89 7.4 21.9 5.8 22
Hyundai 426.5 4.49 22.1 4.8 21
Volkswagen 316.21 3.33 20.7 4.2 30
BMW 310.75 3.27 18.9 3.8 16
Mazda 264.79 2.79 21.9 3.0 17
Mercedes 227.13 2.39 16.7 2.1 22
Kia 213.09 2.25 23 4.9 14
Subaru 160.84 1.7 20.8 1.3 10
Mitsubishi 107.98 1.14 20.2 2.1 11
Suzuki 79.97 0.84 21.2 2.7 11
Porsche 28.55 0.3 17.7 2.4 8
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Table B.2: Manufacturers’ initial characteristics in the French market for 2007. Fuel economy
expressed as harmonic mean.
Manufacturer Sales Market share Mean fuel economy Std. dev. # of
(in 1,000) (in %) (in mpg) (in mpg) car models
PSA 364.26 31.31 42.9 10.6 40
Renault 254.59 21.88 41.3 9.8 18
Volkswagen 131.6 11.31 39.0 9.2 62
Toyota 69.71 5.99 40.5 14.0 29
Ford 69.28 5.95 40.0 9.3 46
GM 57.56 4.95 39.4 9.2 34
Mercedes 39.7 3.41 35.0 12.3 30
BMW 39.05 3.36 35.89 9.0 17
Fiat 37.63 3.23 41.8 9.3 41
Suzuki 23.46 2.02 35.8 7.7 16
Hyundai 21.36 1.84 37.2 9.2 33
Nissan 20.85 1.79 35.9 10.4 25
Honda 10.59 0.91 39.2 16.5 11
Mazda 9.53 0.82 37.2 9.5 10
Chrysler 6.97 0.6 29.0 7.5 24
Mitsubishi 3.58 0.31 27.7 10.8 9
Porsche 1.96 0.17 19.6 3.4 4
Ssangyong 1.81 0.16 27.9 2.5 5
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Table B.3: Distribution of compliers, payers, and non-constrained manufacturers for different
levels of the standard and penalty in both countries
U.S. France
Standard Penalty # # # non- # # # non-
($/mpg) compliers payers constrained compliers payers constrained
+1% 300 0 10 6 3 12 3
+3% 300 2 11 3 3 12 3
+5% 300 0 13 3 3 14 1
+7% 300 2 13 1 4 14 0
+9% 300 1 14 1 1 17 0
+11% 300 0 15 1 1 17 0
+13% 300 0 15 1 0 18 0
+15% 300 0 15 1 0 18 0
+5% 75 0 13 3 0 17 1
+5% 200 0 13 3 3 14 1
+5% 400 1 12 3 4 13 1
+5% 600 2 11 3 5 12 1
+5% 800 2 11 3 7 10 1
+5% 1000 3 10 3 11 6 1
+5% 1200 3 10 3 13 4 1
+5% 1400 3 10 3 14 3 1
+5% 1600 3 10 3 14 3 1
Notes: The standard levels are percentages relative to the initial average fuel efficiency: 21.5 mpg in
the U.S. and 40.2 mpg in France.
Table B.3 presents the distribution of manufacturers’ reactions for both countries. As ex-
pected, the number of non-constrained manufacturers decreases in both countries as we
increase the standard but is unchanged with an increase of the penalty. The number of
compliers exhibits in general a bell-shaped curve in both countries when we increase the
standard. Indeed, the status of manufacturers first switches from non-constrained to com-
plier at low levels of the standard, and then switches from complier to payer for high levels
of the standard. When the penalty is increased, we observe a marked movement from payers
towards compliance in France. In contrast, in the U.S. this movement is not as pronounced
yielding a final number of 3 compliers.
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Table B.4: Equivalent feebate parameters for different levels of policy stringency in both
countries
Standard Penalty Feebate Pivot Feebate Pivot
($/mpg) rate (τ) point (e˜) rate (τ) point (e˜)
U.S. France
+1% 300 98 24.1 102 42.3
+3% 300 118 24.3 119 42.8
+5% 300 133 24.6 158 43.2
+7% 300 139 25.1 200 43.6
+9% 300 168 25.2 253 44.1
+11% 300 180 25.5 285 44.7
+13% 300 182 26 300 45.4
+15% 300 184 26.5 300 46.2
+5% 75 34 24.7 54 43
+5% 200 90 24.7 122 43.1
+5% 400 173 24.6 185 43.2
+5% 600 243 24.6 235 42.9
+5% 800 304 24.6 269 42.6
+5% 1000 360 24.5 282 42.5
+5% 1200 413 24.4 286 42.4
+5% 1400 465 24.3 287 42.4
+5% 1600 515 24.2 288 42.4
Notes: The feebate rate τ represents the tax (subsidy) associated with a
car which is 1 mpg above (below) the feebate pivot point e˜.
Table B.4 displays the parameters of the equivalent feebate schemes associated with each
level of policy stringency. We find that increasing the level of the standard leads to increasing
changes in the rate of the feebate up to the level of the penalty. The pivot point levels increase
with the standard reflecting a larger tax base.
When the penalty increases, the rate of the feebate, τ , increases monotonically in both
countries while the values of the feebate pivot points are most of the time decreasing. There
is a trade-off between increasing the feebate rate and increasing the set of cars taxed when
increasing the pivot point, therefore a decrease in the pivot point can be compensated by a
greater feebate rate.
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Table B.5: Imported models
Manufacturer Brand Models
BMW BMW Series 1
Ford Ford Galaxy, Mondeo, S-Max, Fiesta, Ka
Volvo C30
GM Chevrolet Matiz, Rezzo, Epica, Nubira, Kalos, Lacetti, Evanda
Hyundai Hyundai I30, Matrix, Getz, Atos, Tiburon
Mercedes Mercedes A Class, B Class
Mazda Mazda MX5, 2
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Grandis, Colt
Nissan Nissan X-Trail, Primera, Micra, Note, Almera, Qashqai
Suzuki Suzuki Swift, Jimny, Wagon-R, Alto, Vitara, Gran Vitara, Ignis
Volkswagen Audi A5, S3
Volkswagen Caddy, Fox, Polo, Touran
Table B.6: New hybrid models and their brand
U.S. France
Manufacturer Brand Model Brand Model
BMW BMW Series 3 Mini Mini
Chrysler Chrysler 300 Dodge Caliber
Hyundai Hyundai Sonata Hyundai Tucson
Mazda Mazda 3 Mazda 3
Mercedes Mercedes Class C Mercedes Class C
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Eclipse Mitsubishi Pajero
Porsche Porsche 911 Porsche 911
Suzuki Suzuki Forenza Suzuki Swift
Volkswagen Volkswagen Jetta Volkswagen Golf
GM Chevrolet Impala Opel Corsa
Kia Kia Spectra
Subaru Subaru Legacy
Fiat Fiat Punto
Ford Ford Fiesta
Nissan Nissan Qashqai
Renault Renault Clio
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Appendix C: Online Appendix (not for publication)
Table C.1: Simulation results for the U.S. market, for different values of the standard
Policy Standard Sales Profits Tax rev. CO2 (mill. W w/CO2 # prefer
type (%) (1,000s) + CS (bn $) (bn $) tons) (bn $) standard
Standard +1 9,337 146.5 2.4 52.6 238.6 9
Feebate 9,345 146.7 2.4 52.6 238.9
Standard +3 9,295 145.5 3.1 52.2 238.1 9
Feebate 9,302 145.8 3.1 52.3 238.3
Standard +5 9,244 144.5 3.9 51.8 237.4 8
Feebate 9,253 144.7 3.9 51.9 237.7
Standard +7 9,191 143.3 4.8 51.5 236.8 7
Feebate 9,200 143.6 4.8 51.5 237.1
Standard +9 9,132 142.1 5.7 51 236 6
Feebate 9,140 142.3 5.7 51 236.3
Standard +11 9,066 140.7 6.7 50.5 235.1 6
Feebate 9,077 140.9 6.7 50.6 235.5
Standard +13 8,999 139.3 7.8 50.1 234.3 5
Feebate 9,011 139.5 7.8 50.1 234.7
Standard +15 8,930 137.8 8.8 49.6 233.4 6
Feebate 8,943 138.1 8.8 49.7 233.8
Notes: Welfare includes the tax revenue and the CO2 emissions using a value of 36$/tCO2. For the
standard regulation, φ = 300 $/mpg.
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Table C.2: Simulation results for the French market, for different values of the standard
Policy Standard Sales Profits Tax rev. CO2 (mill. W w/CO2 # prefer
type (%) (1,000s) + CS (bn $) (bn $) tons) (bn $) standard
Standard +1 1,146 14.4 0.2 2.5 28.1 7
Feebate 1,150 14.5 0.2 2.5 28.2
Standard +3 1,139 14.3 0.2 2.5 28 5
Feebate 1,144 14.4 0.2 2.5 28.1
Standard +5 1,131 14.2 0.3 2.5 27.9 5
Feebate 1,135 14.3 0.3 2.5 28
Standard +7 1,120 14.1 0.4 2.5 27.7 5
Feebate 1,124 14.1 0.4 2.5 27.8
Standard +9 1,106 13.9 0.5 2.4 27.5 4
Feebate 1,108 13.9 0.5 2.4 27.5
Standard +11 1,090 13.6 0.7 2.4 27.2 4
Feebate 1,090 13.6 0.7 2.4 27.2
Standard +13 1,072 13.3 0.9 2.3 27 −
Feebate 1,072 13.3 0.9 2.3 27
Standard +15 1,054 13.1 1.2 2.3 26.7 −
Feebate 1,054 13.1 1.2 2.3 26.7
Welfare includes the tax revenue and the CO2 emissions using a value of 36$/tCO2. For the standard
regulation, φ = 300 $/mpg. In the last two rows, since the feebate rate equals the value of the penalty,
manufacturers are indifferent between the two policies.
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Table C.3: Simulation results for the U.S. market, for different values of the penalty
Policy Penalty Sales Profits Tax rev. CO2 (mill. W w/CO2 # prefer
type ($/mpg) (1,000s) + CS (bn $) (bn $) tons) (bn $) standard
Standard 75 9,422 148.3 1.2 53.4 239.8 8
Feebate 75 9,423 148.3 1.2 53.4 239.8
Standard 100 9,401 147.9 1.5 53.2 239.5 8
Feebate 100 9,402 147.9 1.5 53.2 239.6
Standard 300 9,244 144.5 3.9 51.8 237.4 8
Feebate 300 9,253 144.7 3.9 51.9 237.7
Standard 500 9,109 141.5 5.6 50.6 235.2 8
Feebate 500 9,135 142.2 5.6 50.8 236.1
Standard 700 8,991 139.1 6.8 49.6 233 7
Feebate 700 9,041 140.2 6.8 49.9 234.6
Standard 900 8,890 136.9 7.4 48.8 230.8 7
Feebate 900 8,970 138.8 7.4 49.2 233.3
Standard 1100 8,802 135.1 7.7 48 228.7 7
Feebate 1100 8,921 137.8 7.7 48.6 232.2
Standard 1300 8,728 133.6 7.6 47.3 226.5 6
Feebate 1300 8,891 137.2 7.6 48.2 231.4
Standard 1500 8,667 132.3 7.2 46.7 224.4 6
Feebate 1500 8,880 137 7.2 47.9 230.7
Standard 1750 8,606 131.1 6.2 46.1 221.7 6
Feebate 1750 8,891 137.3 6.2 47.6 230.1
Notes: Notes: Welfare includes the tax revenue and the CO2 emissions using a value of 36$/tCO2. The
level of the standard is fixed at 5% over the initial mpg.
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Table C.4: Simulation results for the French market, for different values of the penalty
Policy Penalty Sales Profits Tax rev. CO2 (mill. W w/CO2 # prefer
type ($/mpg) (1,000s) + CS (bn $) (bn $) tons) (bn $) standard
Standard 75 1,152 14.5 0.2 2.6 28.2 5
Feebate 75 1,152 14.5 0.2 2.6 28.2
Standard 100 1,149 14.5 0.2 2.5 28.2 5
Feebate 100 1,150 14.5 0.2 2.5 28.2
Standard 300 1,131 14.2 0.3 2.5 27.9 5
Feebate 300 1,135 14.3 0.3 2.5 28
Standard 500 1,121 14.1 0.3 2.4 27.6 5
Feebate 500 1,131 14.2 0.3 2.5 27.8
Standard 700 1,116 14 0.2 2.4 27.3 5
Feebate 700 1,133 14.3 0.2 2.5 27.8
Standard 900 1,114 14 0.1 2.4 27.2 5
Feebate 900 1,136 14.3 0.1 2.5 27.8
Standard 1100 1,113 14 0 2.4 27.1 5
Feebate 1100 1,138 14.3 0 2.5 27.8
Standard 1300 1,113 14 0 2.4 27.1 5
Feebate 1300 1,138 14.4 0 2.5 27.8
Standard 1500 1,113 14 0 2.4 27.1 5
Feebate 1500 1,138 14.4 0 2.5 27.8
Standard 1750 1,113 13.9 0 2.4 27.1 5
Feebate 1750 1,138 14.4 0 2.5 27.8
Notes: Notes: Welfare includes the tax revenue and the CO2 emissions using a value of 36$/tCO2. The
level of the standard is fixed at 5% over the initial mpg.
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Figure C.1: Consumer surplus and emissions changes by policy instrument and country
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Notes: For the first column, φ = 300$/mpg. In the second column, the standard is set to 5% above
initial mpg.
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